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ABSTRACT 
Such demographic factors in Europe as low fertility rates, high life expectancy, 
and the restricted immigration policy have caused European societies to age rapidly and 
the population of Europe will dramatically decline over the next thirty years.  In 
comparison to Europe, the trend of aging in developing counties, for example in the 
Middle East and Northern Africa, presents a stark contrast.  Taking into account 
demographic trends like aging, global distribution of the population, and migration, 
Europe faces increasing geopolitical challenges in the future, based on the cleavages 
“north versus south,” “rich versus poor,” and “old versus young.” 
From a domestic point of view of Continental Europe, the demographic factors 
are responsible not only for a declining workforce but also for increasing retirement rates.  
The consequences are a decreasing GDP and increasing social welfare costs.  So, further 
development of European armed forces in an uncertain world has to take place in this 
tense financial situation. 
Taking the goals of the European Security Strategy into account and considering 
the necessity that the military capabilities have to be adapted to meet a new threat 
scenario, this thesis tries to illustrate why Europe has to intensify its efforts of European 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. IMPORTANCE 
In 2003, the San Diego Union Tribune printed an article that raised the question, 
“NATO in the 21st Century: Defeated by Demography?”  By using NATO as an example, 
the author illustrates the changes in the median age of its member countries and compares 
them to the trend of aging in developing countries.  Among others, the author points out 
that during the last fifty years the median age increased from 31 to 36 years and will 
increase to 44 by the year 2050.  Not taking the United States and Turkey into account, 
the median age will be 49.  In contrast to NATO countries, the author says, the median 
age in the Middle East is under 19.  With respect to security aspects he argues that, 
among the twenty-five youngest countries in the world, sixteen have had major conflicts 
during the last ten years.  Among the twenty-five oldest countries, however, only Croatia 
faced a major conflict during that same period of time.1 
These observations were already recognized by the British government in 2001.  
It points out in the British Defence Policy that demography and social factors do not only 
influence military requirements like recruiting, but also affect “the security situation in a 
number of regions.”  This in turn may lead to “increasing pressures for peace support, 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.”2 
This quote, taken from the British Defence Policy of 2001, indicates that today 
the expression security cannot be defined only in terms of “Country X is an enemy and 
possesses the following military capabilities;” issues like non military threats emerging 
from “domestic internal sources of instability” have to be taken into account too.3  
However, John J. Hamre, the president and CEO of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, emphasized at a conference on Economic and Budgetary Impacts of 
                                                 
1 Craig Romm, “NATO in the 21st Century: Defeated by Demography?” The San Diego Union 
Tribune, October 4, 2002. 
2 British Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy 2001, 12 November 2001, 
http://www.mod.uk/issues/policy2001/context.htm (accessed 22 November 2004). 
3 Myron Weiner and Sharon Stanton Russel, Demography and National Security (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2001): 3. 
2 
Global Aging in March 2003 that “there is only a general body of theory that links 
demography and geostrategic power.”4  He continued explaining that the two classical 
approaches embrace in general terms the theories that “countries with large populations 
are more powerful then countries with small populations” and that the “second general 
area of theory of demography and political power concerns rising and declining 
population bases.”  In other words, it is argued that countries with declining population 
bases are accompanied by a declining economic strength, too, and that this is an incentive 
for other countries to “expand into that space.”  However, so Hamre argues, this 
theoretical body “depends critically” on the role that societal leaders take in shaping these 
trends in the “context of […] social and economic policies.”5 
Myron Weiner, the former Director of MIT’s Center for International Studies and 
Chair of the External Research Advising Committee of the UNHCR, already stressed this 
point in his book Demography and National Security.  He argues on the one hand that 
scholars have incorporated arguments like “population growth [and] environmental 
degradation” but on the other hand that demographers have “largely ignored the topic of 
political demography.”6  Furthermore, he emphasizes that political scientists and 
international relations scholars have “seldom incorporated demographic considerations 
into their analysis of conflicts between states […] or of how development within states 
shape international conflict.”7 
He underlines this statement by further arguing that many scholars have 
“eschewed examining the relationship between demography and security.”  In contrast, 
he writes, practitioners like militaries and security agencies do so.8 
                                                 
4 John Hamre, “The Geopolitical Implications of Global Ageing in the Industrialized Countries,” 
Remarks by John J. Hamre President and CEO Center for Strategic and International Studies at a 
conference on The Economic and Budgetary Impacts of Global Ageing 4 March 2003 Brussels – Belgium: 
1, http://www.csis.org/gai/brussels/hamre.pdf (accessed 6 November 2004). 
5 Ibid., 1. 
6 Myron Weiner and Sharon Stanton Russel, Demography and National Security (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2001): 4. 
7 Ibid., 5. 
8 Ibid., 5. 
3 
This requirement, to link demographic and security issues, was also already 
postulated by the Deputy Director of International Security Studies, CSIS9, Dan Gouré, at 
the CSIS Policy Summit on Global Aging in January 2000, and in November 2000 this 
issue was addressed by RAND during a “Demography and Security” workshop in Paris, 
France.10 
As already mentioned at the start, Great Britain formulated in its defense policy 
for the first time in 2001 the need to regard demographic developments in respect to 
national security issues.  Their policy points out not only that demography and social 
factors do influence military requirements like recruiting, but also that demographic 
trends affect “the security situation in a number of regions.”  This in turn may lead to 
“increasing pressures for peace support, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
operations.”11  In comparison to the formulation of the British Defence Policy, the 
German Defense Policy Guideline of 2003 addresses the impact of demographic factors 
on the national and European defense policy rather more indirectly as “unresolved 
political, ethnic, religious, economic and social conflicts combined with international 
terrorism, organized crime on an international scale and increasing migratory 
movements.”12 
In contrast to the military side, the Enquête-Commission “Demographic Changes” 
of the German parliament does not even address security problems in its report, but 
covers only social aspects and integration issues of immigrants.13 
However, demographic developments do not only affect national and European 
security but also future developments of societal capabilities.  Whereas the developing 
countries have high birth rates, the societies of developed countries are aging rapidly.  In 
                                                 
9 CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
10 Daniel Gouré, “International Security and the Aging Crisis,” CSIS International Security Program 
(December 2000), http://www.csis.org/gai/intlsecaging.pdf (accessed 6 November 2004). 
11 British Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy 2001, 12 November 2001, 
http://www.mod.uk/issues/policy2001/context.htm (accessed 22 November 2004). 
12 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Defence policy Guidelines for the area of responsibility of the 
Federal Minister of Defence, Berlin, 21 May 2003: 6-7. 
13 Deutscher Bundestag, Schlussbericht der Enquête-Kommission, „Demographischer Wandel –
Herausforderungen unserer älter werdenden Gesellschaft an den Einzelnen und die Politik“ 14. 
Wahlperiode, Bundesdrucksache 14/8800, 28 March 2002. 
4 
combination with a higher life expectancy, this leads in sum to two effects working in 
opposite directions.  The workforce and therefore the GDP will decline, but the age 
dependency ratio will increase and with it spending for social welfare in particular. 
Due to this development the funding of military budget will be under strong 
pressure.  Furthermore, European militaries have to compete with industry to recruit 
highly skilled and motivated personnel.  Moreover, the armed forces of the European 
nations are presently undergoing a transformation process to meet the requirements of the 
Defense Capability Initiative of NATO or of the European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) of the EU.  This transformation process, however, effecting equipment, 
technology, training, and organization issues, collides and will collide with social 
requirements as the budgetary possibilities become tighter and tighter in the future. 
In order to get the most effective armed forces with respect to the budgetary 
constraints, this thesis argues that the European integration has to be fostered further and 
deepened.  Europe has to enhance its effort to integrate and transform national into 
European armed forces to compensate for demographic difficulties that lie ahead. 
 
B. HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since 1990 the European countries have paid the peace dividend and reduced their 
troops tremendously.  On the other hand, a new threat environment in the immediate 
proximity of Europe, namely in the Mahgreb countries and in the Middle East has 
emerged that, among others, can be explained by demographic trends.  These trends, 
however, develop in the opposite direction that the demographic trends in European 
countries do.  So consequently, because of the shrinking European societies and the new 
threat perception, the European armed forces must be transformed into highly mobile, 
light, and highly engineered forces.  On the other hand, the demographic development of 
European countries will lead a tremendous increase of social welfare expenditures which 
will further foster their reluctance to increase military budgets. 
5 
While contrasting this tension between social necessities and military 
requirements, this thesis contributes to answering questions concerning Europe’s possible 
reactions and policy options.  The central questions are discussed in the following order: 
• What are the key variables that describe the growth and decline of the 
population? 
• What are the global demographic trends? 
• How do these global trends affect European security and which region is 
the most likely threat to European security? 
• How is the European economy effected by demographic trends? 
• How does the demographic development in Europe influence social 
welfare spending on health care, pensions, education, unemployment, and 
public debt? 
• Taking the threat assessment and economic development into account, 
how is the development of European armed forces influenced in respect to 
subjects like military budgets? 
• What possible measures have to be applied in order to extenuate the 
demographic trends? 
 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
To narrow this broad topic, the analysis concentrates on four select countries, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, to represent the demographic development of 
Europe.  These four are the largest and their demographic problems are the most urgent.  
In regard to the ongoing military transformation process, European forces are supposed to 
be deployed worldwide.  Furthermore, only countries in the nearer geographic vicinity of 
Europe are considered in this analysis.  With respect to European security issues, only the 
countries of the Middle East and the Mahgreb are considered. 
Dependant on the availability of data, the projected scenarios range from 1950 
through 2040-2050.  This time-range is chosen because demographers assume that the 
demographic transition process in most of the countries will have been completed within 
that period.14 
                                                 
14 Richard Jackson and Neil Howe, The 2003 Aging Vulnerability Index: An Assessment of the 
Capacity of Twelve Developed Countries to Meet the Aging Challenges, (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2003): 4, 
www.csis.org/gai/aging_index.pdf (accessed 6 November 2004). 
6 
First, this thesis explores the key demographic variables and trends globally; and 
it then focuses on Europe in order to clarify the different demographic developments.  In 
the next step, the trends are discussed in respect to their strategic implications for 
European national security.  In the light of those implications I analyze the impact on 
economics caused by demographic trends.  In particular the relation between workforce, 
birth rate, and retirement is discussed.  And in the light of that discussion I calculate 
appraisals of the future GDP and budgets for military and social issues respectively.  In 
order to demonstrate the tension between social and military budgets in Europe, the next 
section examines the impact of a declining society on the social welfare system.  In the 
section discussing military budgets, the budgets are assumed to represent a certain 
fraction of the GDP, whereas the share of military investments is expressed as a certain 
percentage of the military budget.  Finally, I discuss the goals of the European Security 
Strategy within the framework of the fiscal possibilities, recruitment, drafting, equipment, 
technology, training and organization.  Based on those results and constraints, the further 
development of European armed forces is rendered a subject of prediction. 
To support my argument, I draw on research in various books, papers, and 
articles, dealing with these issues.  To predict future development, I also use reports, 
statistics, and other data from many U.S. and European organizations (CSIS, EU, IISS, 
IMF, NATO, OECD, PAI, RAND, SIPRI, UN, and UNESCO).  The graphs presented in 
this thesis, compiled by the author, are based on raw data presented by those 
organizations.  To project future economic growth, I set up my extrapolation on data 
derived from economic growth trends in the past.  To take into account the impact of 
future demographic developments, I considered appropriate data calculated by the 
European Policy Committee in my projections.  In the case graphs developed and 
published by other authors are used by me in modified form, this will be explicitly noted. 
 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The introduction in Chapter I outlines the importance of this topic and develops 
the hypothesis and the research question.  The methodology and sources used are also 
described.  For a better understanding, Chapter II introduces and defines special 
7 
demographic terms used in the thesis.  Chapter III then describes the relationship between 
a former historical understanding of national power and demographic development.  The 
appropriate key demographic variables, which are fertility, mortality, and migration, are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.  In the subsequent chapter the key variables are 
used to develop demographic trends.  Here, issues such as aging versus youth bulge, and 
urbanization and urban growth, are emphasized.  The chapter focuses on possible 
implications of the presented demographic trends for future conflict, and illustrates the 
changes in sources of national power, in sources of conflict, and in the nature of conflict. 
Having outlined basic demographic developments and their implication for 
security issues, Chapter VI describes the shift in European and NATO security 
perceptions caused by political developments since the end of the Cold War.  In addition, 
Chapter VI presents the need for reforms and the adaptation of the European military to 
the new emerging threat scenario.  Following up on the findings of Chapter VI, Chapter 
VII discusses the tension between military requirements influenced by demographic 
developments in appropriate foreign countries on the one hand, and the social necessities 
caused by the demographic development in European countries on the other hand.  
Furthermore Chapter VII describes the demographic influence on the economic 
development in Europe and on the social system to demonstrate that, due to the necessary 
increase of social welfare spending, there is hardly any leeway available to increase 
military budgets.  Then it discusses the European defense efforts under those financial 
and socio-political constraints.  Chapter VIII introduces the present ongoing reform and 
transformation process to show that improvements are presently being achieved by 
internal optimization.  In case, these internal improvements are exhausted and come to an 
end, however, different policy options must be taken into account. Those are discussed in 
the second part of Chapter VIII.  Chapter XI summarizes the main findings and concludes 
that, to get the most effective armed forces with respect to the budgetary constraints, 
European integration must be further fostered and deepened.  Furthermore, this thesis 
concludes that Europe must enhance its effort to integrate and transform national forces 
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9 
II. DEFINITIONS 
Most of the definitions in this chapter are from the United Nations Population 
Division glossary.15  Those that are not are so indicated. 
 
Crude birth rate: Number of births over a given period divided by the 
person-years lived by the population over that 
period. It is expressed as number of births per 1,000 
population. 
 
Crude death rate: Number of deaths over a given period divided by 
the person-years lived by the population over that 
period. It is expressed as number of deaths per 
1,000 population. 
 
Dependency ratio: The total dependency ratio is the number of persons 
under age 15 plus persons aged 65 or older per 
hundred persons 15 to 64.  It is the sum of the youth 
dependency ratio and the old-age dependency ratio.  
The youth dependency ratio is the number of 
persons 0 to 14 years per hundred persons 15 to 64 
years.  The old-age dependency ratio is the number 
of persons 65 years and over per one hundred 
persons 15 to 64 years. 
 
Health expenditure: Total expenditure (on health and long-term care) 
includes: 
services of curative care (HC1); 
services of rehabilitative care (HC2); 
services of long-term nursing care (HC3); 
ancillary services to health care (HC4); 
medical goods dispensed to outpatients (HC5); 
prevention and public health services (HC6); 
and health administration and health insurance 
(HC7), plus investment in medical facilities.16 
 
                                                 
15 United Nations Population Division, http://esa.un.org/unpp/Glossary.html (accessed 1 January 
2005). 
16 OECD System of Health Accounts, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/51/21160591.pdf (accessed 
30 April 2005). 
10 
Rate of natural increase: Crude birth rate minus the crude death rate. 
Represents the portion, determined exclusively by 
births and deaths. 
 
School life expectancy: Number of years a child is expected to remain at 
school or university, including years spent on 
repetition. It is the sum of the age specific 
enrolment ratios for primary, secondary, post-
secondary, non-tertiary and tertiary education.17 
 
Total fertility rate: The average number of children a hypothetical 
cohort of women would have at the end of their 
reproductive period if they were subject during their 
whole lives to the fertility rates of a given period 
and if they were not subject to mortality.  It is 
expressed as children per woman. 
 
Young adults: Number of persons 15 to 29 years per hundred 
persons 15 years and over.18 
 
                                                 
17 UNESCO, “Global Monitoring Report 2003/2004,” http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=24188&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 6 January 2005).  
18 Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman, and Daniele Anastasion, The Security Demographic: 
Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War, (Washington D.C., Population Action International, 
2003), 89. 
11 
III. POPULATION AND NATIONAL POWER IN HISTORY 
Looking back in European history, the size of population was one factor that 
contributed to the rise and fall of national power, politically, militarily, and economically.  
Rapid population growth and differential growth rates led to migration, changes in 











































Figure 1.   Population history of selected European countries 
 
From the middle of the 17th century on, until the end of the Napoleonic Wars, 
France was the biggest power in Europe.  During this period its population numbered 20 
million, which was two times more than that of the Holy Roman Empire, three times 
more than England and Scotland together, and four times more than the population of 
Spain.20  Almost a hundred years later, Europe was hit by a population explosion.  
Europe had counted 130 million inhabitants, but by approximately in 1800 the population 
                                                 
19 Civil Intelligence Agency, Long-Term Global Demographic Trends: Reshaping the Geopolitical 
Landscape, July 2001: 12-17, http://www.eldis.org/static/doc9390.htm (accessed 6 November 2004). 
20 Hagen Schulz, States, Nations and Nationalism, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002): 52. 
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had increased to 266 million.21  At the beginning of the French Revolution the population 
of France numbered approximately 28 million with a ratio of youth to adults 
( )∑∑ >≤ 1818 nn  of 0.8.22 
However, the industrial revolution had not yet taken place in France on the same 
scale as in Great Britain, so agriculture still relied on manpower.  Despite new 
agricultural methods like superseding the three-field system of cultivation, it was hard to 
align food production with the growth in population.  In contrast to Great Britain, France 
often experienced bad harvests that resulted in “disettes” (famines), as in 1788, 1812, 
1817, and 1846-47.23  Due to underdeveloped markets and insufficient transportation 
systems, regional shortages in food supply could not be compensated for and the 
population had to fall back on its reserves.  In 1788, because of the unleash of grain 
prices, the price for bread was almost 80% of the family income.  With the outburst of the 
French revolution on 14 July 1789 the bread prices reached the highest level of the 
century.24  In this light of these factors, I argue that the French Revolution was a result 
not only of the influence of industrialization and the Enlightenment, but also of 
demographic development in France. 
Although Napoleon was able to recruit an army from this society large enough to 
conquer almost all of Europe, for some reason, the birth rate in France declined with the 
beginning of the 19th century, long before improvements in living standards and health 
could influence the rate of mortality and compensate for the declining birth rates.  
Consequently,  France  “fell behind  in  the  race  of  population”  and  was  surpassed  by  
                                                 
21 Hagen Schulz, States, Nations and Nationalism, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002): 138. 
22 Civil Intelligence Agency, Long-Term Global Demographic Trends: Reshaping the Geopolitical 
Landscape, July 2001: 13, http://www.eldis.org/static/doc9390.htm (accessed 6 November 2004). 
23 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 17. 
24 Christopf Bühler, „Die Französische Revolution,“ 
http://www.zum.de/Faecher/G/BW/neuzeit/frzrev/fr2.htm (accessed 31 December 2004). 
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Prussia and Great Britain.25  From the French perspective, it was this demographic 
decline that was responsible for the lack of national power and for France’s defeat in 
1870/71 and 1940.26 
The French historian and demographer Alfred Sauvy (1898-1990) commented on 
this situation in 1962: 
The difference between France and other countries, this drying up of the 
sap at the moment of great expansion, is the most important fact of all her 
history; it has determined all subsequent development and is still in action 
today.27 
However, even during the age of the French Third Republic (1871-1940), French 
intellectuals and officials had already realized this situation, which finally led to strong 
pronatalist feelings which were combined with a strong sense of nationhood.28  
Nevertheless, the French population could not be convinced that France was endangered 
by the poor demographic development.  Although this situation was already perceived in 
1870 by conservatives as having a negative and dangerous impact on the security of 
France, the socialist and liberal representatives in the National Assembly prevented 
pronatalist bills from passing until the 1930s. In 1920, the French Prime Minister 
Clémenceau reacted to this crisis by stating: “France is lost, as soon no French people 
will exist anymore.”29  It took the French defeat in 1940 to convince members of all 
parties that an increase of fertility was of vital importance for the existence of France.30  
Thus, Marshall Pétain explained the reasons for the French defeat during a radio speech 
on June 17, 1940, with the following words: 
                                                 
25 C. Alison McIntosh, “Low Fertility and Liberal Democracy in Western Europe,” Population and 
Development Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1981): 183. 
26 Ibid., 183. 
27 Ibid., 184. 
28 Ibid., 184  
29 Michael Mönninger, “Demographie als Volkssport,” Die Zeit, 10/2004. 
30 C. Alison McIntosh, “Low Fertility and Liberal Democracy in Western Europe,” Population and 
Development Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1981): 195. 
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Trop peu d’éfants, trop peu d’armes, trop peu d’alliés: voilà notre 
défaite.(too few children, too few weapons, too few allies: That has 
brought about our defeat.)31 
In 1945, Charles de Gaulles also made a plea for higher birth rates, stating: 
”France needs 12 million babies.”32 
As a result of these demographic experiences, in 1945, France finally founded a 
government-based demographic research institute, the Institut National d’Études 
Démographique (INED) and initiated a generous family finance policy. 
In the last third of the 19th century, the population in Great Britain began to grow 
very rapidly.  Thus, with respect to the expense for daily living, the British had the same 
experience as the French.  The price of wheat increased, for example, during the fifteen 
years after 1789, by approximately 220%.33  However, in contrast to France, this 
development did not contribute to a revolution, but instead helped to foster the process of 
industrialization and was eased by emigration to the American colonies. 
For almost 150 years Great Britain and France lived in a continuous state of 
war.34  Triggered by a concern that Britain’s population growth could not compete with 
that of France, and living in fear from the steady threat of a French invasion, social 
welfare became vital for Great Britain. 
A cult of prolific maternity was immensely attractive […] to those who 
believed that Britain’s population was in decline, and to those who simply 
wanted more live births so that the nation might better compete in terms of 
cannon-fodder with France.35 
Triggered by these concerns, a “spate of maternity hospitals” were established by 
the middle of the 18th century.  Women were encouraged to raise their toddlers by breast-
                                                 
31 Michael Mönninger, “Demographie als Volkssport,” Die Zeit, 10/2004. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992): 
158. 
34 1689-1687 Nine Years War, 1702-1713 War of Spanish Succession, 1739-1748 War of Austrian 
Succession, 1756-1763 Seven Years War, 1793-1802 French Revolutionary War, 1803-1815 Napoleonic 
Wars. 
35 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992): 
240. 
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feeding instead of wet-nursing.  Foundlings and orphans were rescued, raised, and 
educated in facilities such as the Marine Society, whose motto was: “For the Service of 
our Country.”36  Even the former Prince of Wales patronized an organization in London, 
called the “Lying-in Charity for Married Women at their own Habitations,” under the 
motto “Increase of Children a Nation’s Strength.”37 
Whereas France and Great Britain were already or were on their way to becoming 
nations, in 1815, Germany was still a fragmented state.  Even after having fought in the 
Grande Coalition against Napoleon, it was not in the interest of France, Great Britain, 
Russia, and Austria to agree to a unified Germany.  They feared that Germany might 
become too powerful and interfere in the balance of power between these other four 
countries.  From their perspective, the German territory could be used as a political and 
geographical buffer zone.  At this time, the German population was already 
approximately 22 million, equal to 73% of the population of France, 110% of the British 
population, 50% of that of Russia, and 74% of that of Austria-Hungary.38  So, on one 
hand, the results of the Congress of Vienna can be seen as an attempt of the crowned 
heads of Europe to reinstall the conditions of the pre-revolutionary era.  However, taking 
into account the demographic situation at the time, the Congress of Vienna can also be 
seen as an example of international relations in which the size of population contributed 
to political decisions. 
Although the German population was still much smaller at the beginning of the 
19th century (compare Figure 1), it continued to grow steadily.  But since the beginning of 
the age of industrialization in Germany, approximately in the 1860s, the German 
population growth started to explode and outnumbered the French population by 30 
million in 1939.  Whereas in France pronatalist policies were mainly driven by the fear of 
German dominance, the prenatalist German policy had been motivated by the national-
socialist ideology since 1933.  So, one of the main issues that dominated the Nazi-
                                                 
36 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992): 
98, 240. 
37 Ibid., 240. 
38 Data were compiled by data given in Örjan Martinsson, “Population history,” Historical Atlas, 
http://www.tacitus.nu/historical-atlas/population/centraleurope.htm (accessed 1. January 2005). 
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German population policy was a belief in a superior Aryan race.39  This basic idea of a 
superior race linking population and national power was not new.  In 1877, the British 
businessman Cecil Rhodes (1853-1902), founder of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) 
exclaimed an extreme position in a memorandum: 
I claim that we are the leading race in the world, and the more of the world 
we populate, the better it will be for mankind…. Since [God] has 
obviously made the English-speaking race the chosen instrument by which 
He means to produce a state of society based on justice, freedom and 
peace, then it is bound to be in keeping with His will if I do everything in 
my power to provide that race with as much scope and power as possible. 
I think that, if there is a God, then He would like to see me do one thing, 
that is, to colour as much of the map of Africa British red as possible.40 
Nonetheless, it was Nazi-Germany that developed this ideology in a population 
policy to an extreme that led from violence to murder and finally to genocide.  So, in the 
era of the Third Reich the goal of its racially motivated population policy was to increase 
the number of “Aryans,” as they were seen as superior to other people, while at the same 
time a distinction of the “racially impure” was justified.41  Furthermore, the National 
Socialist leadership derived from its belief in a “leading race” the justification to oppress 
“non-Aryan nations” and to conquer “living space in the East.”42 
A second issue that was embodied in the National Socialist pronatalist policy, and 
consequently linked to the Nazi-Germany’s overall goal, was the placing of the “common 
need before the individual need.”43  Thus, women during the period of the Third Reich 
“enjoyed a nominally protected but thoroughly subordinate status as the present or future 
mothers of the race.”44  Hence, in order to achieve the goal of increasing birth rates, the 
National Socialist leadership offered different incentives to young couples, such as 
                                                 
39 C. Alison McIntosh, “Low Fertility and Liberal Democracy in Western Europe,” Population and 
Development Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1981): 184. 
40 Hagen Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002): 256. 
41 C. Alison McIntosh, “Low Fertility and Liberal Democracy in Western Europe,” Population and 
Development Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1981): 184. 
42 Ibid., 184. 
43 Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism 1914-1945, (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1995), 194. 
44 Ibid., 195. 
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economic benefits and marriage loans.45  Consequently, the live birth rates increased 
from 971,000 in 1933 to 1.4 million in 1939.46 
Having outlined the demographic development of major European players from a 
historic perspective, I argue that until the end of World War II the national power of 
European nation-states was directly linked to their demographic development and that 
their pronatal policies were justified by a fear of being overwhelmed by another nation. 
Although Europe experienced a baby boom after World War II, an opposite 
development emerged shortly after: namely birth rates started to decline again and, 
combined with a higher life expectancy, European societies began to shrink.  Hence, in 
the following chapter I introduce and discuss key demographic variables: fertility, 
mortality, and migration. 
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IV. KEY DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
As shown by the historical examples in the previous chapter, the size of its 
population was seen as a major link to a nation’s power and, therefore, influenced 
national policies.  However, with the beginning of the Second World War and the end of 
the Balance of Power policy, it became obvious that other variables also contributed to 
national power.  Among others, political, military, and economic alliances, economic and 
technological development, education and the stability of political systems can be 
named.47  But, taking the present global demographic development into account, it is 
questionable, whether these variables compensate for a lack of manpower in the long run.  
The following section gives a short description of three key variables – fertility, 




In order to describe demographic changes and their causes in societies, in 1944 
F.W. Notestein published his work The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet 
Union on behalf of the League of Nations.  Based on his findings, the Office of 
Population Research in Princeton, N.J. formulated the “demographic transition” theory.48  
The theory states that if a society is subject to a process of modernization, it will 
transform from a level of high fertility and mortality to a level where both are low.  
Although this theory was improved over time, especially by explanations of the theory’s 
causal context, its main weakness still remains.  Explanations based on socio-economic, 
economic, institutional, or cultural reasons cannot yet determine the time and speed of 
population  transformation .49  However,  according  to  Dudley  Kirk,  although  no  two  
                                                 
47 C. Alison McIntosh and Barbara B. Crane, “Population Decline: A Threat to the West?” Family 
Planning Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 5 (1986): 235. 
48 Dudley Kirk, “Demographic Transition Theory,” Population Studies, Vol. 50, No. 3 (1996): 363. 
49 Ibid., 386. 
20 
countries were subject to the same transformation trajectory due to too many 
combinations of the determining variables fertility, mortality, and migration, the theory 
holds in general.50 
Applying these findings to industrialized, industrializing, or developing countries, 
it is noticeable that industrialized countries not only went through a transformation 
process caused by modernization, but also through a second demographic transformation 













































































Figure 2.   Regional Total Fertility Rate 
 
So since 1960, the population pyramid has changed from a bell shape to a more 
inverted one.  Although a total fertility rate of 2.1 is needed to replace a society without 
shrinkage, in many countries the total fertility rate dropped below this level.51 
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51 Josef Schmid, “Population Aging: Dynamics, and Social and Economic Implications at Family, 
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Figure 3.   Total Fertility Rate Distribution 
(After) Chris Wilson and Gilles Pison, “More than half of the global population lives where fertility 
is below the replacement level.” 
 
Looking back at the last fifty years, we find that the median fertility rate was still 
at a level of approximately six births per woman.  Since then, the rate has been dropping 
dramatically, with the result that anytime in 2003 and 2004 50 percent of the world’s 
population was now in countries whose total fertility rate was less or equal to 2.1.52  
Furthermore, Figure 3 illustrates a dramatic drop in the total fertility rate of the 
countries of the Mahgreb and the Middle East.  There the fertility rates dropped by 65 
percent and 50 percent respectively over the last fifty years.  In contrast to European 
countries, their fertility rate is still well above the inter-generational replacement rate.  In 
other words, whereas the European societies are aging and shrinking, the populations of 
the Mahgreb and the Middle East are aging but still growing. 
Although within the framework of the demographic transition theory the decline 
of the total fertility rate cannot be explained with respect to timing and speed in terms of 
the socio-economy, economy, or culture, there are indicators that correlate with this 
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below the replacement level,” Population and Societies, No. 405 (October 2004): 1-2. 
























































decline. One possible explanation is the relation between the declining fertility rate and 
the increasing education and participation of women in the labor force.53 
 
 
Figure 4.   School Life Expectancy 
 
To find some evidence for the above correlation assumptions, I plotted data, as 
available, for select European, Middle East, and Mahgreb countries.  To explore the 
correlation between the total fertility rate and education, I used data representing the 
number of years a girl is expected to remain at school or university, including years spent 
on repetition.  As shown in Figure 4, two trends exist.  First, the more developed a 
country is, the lower its total fertility rate.  Second, the deviation from the trend line 
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The same method was used to show the relation with respect to the share of 
women in the labor force. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Share of Women in the Labor Force 
 
Here too, there is a strong correlation.  However, in contrast to the school-life 
expectancy, there is a much clearer separation between the developed and 
developing/transition countries respectively.  Thus, although the educational conditions 
for women are improving in these regions, their share in the labor force is still small. 
Other reasons for declining birth rates are increasingly better health conditions 
which lead to an increasing life expectancy respectively, and the establishment of social 
welfare systems.  So the need for so-called “insurance births” practiced in former times is 
diminished.  Instead, the family ties are loosening and the desire for children is 
“counterbalanced by the maintenance of a rather individualistic welfare optimum.”54 
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Within the framework of demographic explorations, mortality is closely linked to 
fertility.  Together, these two variables determine the natural growth or decline of a 
population (crude birth rate minus crude death rate).  Compared to declining fertility 
rates, it is much easier to explain the trend of mortality and its possible causes. 
One cause was the establishment of stable institutions in the late 18th and the first 
half of the 19th century and the development of the modern state in Western Europe.  
Within that context among others, agricultural production methods and transportation 
technology were improved.  The fear of probable famines disappeared, as supply 
shortages were compensated supra regionally.  With the end of the German-French war in 
1871, a second long-lasting period of peace began in Western Europe.  Thus the absence 
of wars or conflicts also contributed to the reduction of mortality.55 
During the last third of the 19th century, progress was not only achieved in 
technological fields, but also in medicine, which was greatly improved by some 
revolutionary discoveries.  The findings of Pasteur and Koch, for example, in the field of 
hygiene had a direct influence on the mortality rate.  The infant and maternal death rates 
were reduced, and deaths caused by diseases such as tuberculosis could be reduced by 
vaccinations.  A further contribution to declining death rates was the ability by 1943 to 
mass produce penicillin.56  In sum, the level of mortality rates relies to a great degree on 




While the natural growth or decline of a society is determined by the equation 
fertility rate minus mortality rate and therefore is domestic-minded, a third key variable, 
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migration, is perhaps the most influential because of the effect, especially of foreign 
immigrants, on national security.  In the following discussion of this variable, two aspects 
are considered.  First, I consider the influence of domestic migration, that is, the 
movement of people within their own country from one region to another or from the 
countryside into towns.  Second is the influence of migration from a foreign country, 
either by a forced mass migration due to conflict, civil war, interstate war, economic 
crisis, natural disaster or simply by an expectation of a better future in a foreign country, 
that is, migration due to economic motivation. 
To demonstrate my argument, I explore the migration flows to Europe and within 
North Africa and the Middle East.  See Figure 6 where the figures in parentheses specify 
two groups of uprooted people: 
refugees who are unwilling or unable to return to their home countries 
because they fear persecution or armed conflict there and who lack a 
durable solution; and asylum seekers who are awaiting a refugee status 
determination.58 
Overall, three trends can be identified.  First, the total rate of refugees and asylum 
seekers in Europe is 1.153 million, of which the four biggest countries, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, and Italy host almost 27 percent.  Additionally, Germany already hosts 
legal immigrants who numbers 9 percent of Germany’s total population.  In comparison 
to the United States this is only 0.3 percent less.  In France 6.3 percent and in Great 
Britain 3.6 percent of the population were born in foreign countries.  Second, former 
colonial powers like Great Britain and France have to cope with a huge labor force from 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.  In comparison, Germany and Austria host most of the 
Turkish foreign workers.  Third, whereas the migration between Europe and North Africa 
occurs from mostly economic motivations, the situation is much different in the Middle 
East.  Due to the conflicts in Palestine and Afghanistan, the appropriate neighboring 
countries have to cope with almost 4 million refugees. 
When this situation is viewed with respect to security issues concerning Europe, it 
becomes obvious that European countries have to find solutions for a successful 
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management of their internal security.  They must implement measures to successfully 
integrate foreigners and, due to the unstable situation in the Middle East and its 
implication for neighboring countries, and must increase pressures for peace support, 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.59 
Thus, due to the economically motivated North-South cleavage and the West-East 
cleavage dominated by the Middle East conflict, Europe’s internal security and its 
external security are influenced simultaneously.  The next section discusses the pros and 
cons of migration in more detail. 
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1. Impact on the Receiving European Countries 
Generally, both the sending and the receiving country, are affected with a push-
and-pull effect. 
The demographic situation in Europe can be regarded as a pull factor: the 
workforce will decline dramatically over the next thirty years; the dependency ratio will 
subsequently increase.  Consequently, Europe must find for solutions that replace the 
missing workforce, if it is to keep the financial burden of the social welfare system within 
limits.  John L. Helgerson, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council of the Denver 
World Affairs Council and the Better World Campaign, Denver, CO, stated in 2002 that 
since “EU needs some 1.7 million high-tech workers by 2003, many of them will have to 
come from outside the EU.”60  With respect to this statement, it seems fair to assume that 
migration may be a solution.  However, as positive as this idea may be, disadvantages 
also exist.  As indicated above, Europe needs highly qualified workers.  Most of the 
attracted people, however, are not as educated as desired and therefore work in jobs that 
can be easily vacated in case of economic problems.  Low-educated immigrants are more 
threatened by unemployment than highly skilled ones.  This in turn stresses the social 
welfare system, an effect meant to be avoided.  On behalf of the German General Court, 
Prof. Herwig Birg examined the dependence effect of emigrants on the German social 
welfare system in terms of their length of stay.61  The results are not encouraging.  Only a 
stay longer than 25 years contributes positively to the system, and according to Birg, the 
total balance is still negative.62 
So, in considering migration with respect to its socio-economic impact, a solution 
based on a restricted immigration policy and US-style green cards, as is presently being 
                                                 
60 John L. Helgerson, “The National Security Implications of Global Demographic Change,” speech at 
the Denver World Affairs Council and the Better World Campaign in Denver, CO on April 30, 2002, 
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discussed in the EU, is not enough.63  Rather, using bilateral agreements, European 
countries should consider investing not only in the education of their own population, but 
also by contributions to the education in foreign countries too. 
Migration into Europe, however, has still more impacts.  Immigrants tend to move 
into areas where diasporas of their nationality already exist.  So, instead of being 
assimilated into their new environment, immigrants often retain strong bonds to their 
homeland.  This situation, in combination with a high unemployment rate and lower 
social standards among immigrants, may lead to a higher rate of criminality and 
forcefulness. 
Overall, this scenario raises high demands of the integration process of the 
receiving countries. 
Once immigrants are established in a receiving country, this community serves as 
a “magnets for additional members of their national or ethnic group,” either for family 
reunification or for illegal immigrants.64 
As these problems are expected to be coped with domestically, there is another 
problem that has an even greater impact on European security:  when migration flows 
start to “affect the ethnic composition of the host nation” and “a slower growing ethnic 
group may face a closing window of opportunities.”65  This was the case for example, 
when the Muslim population started to outnumber that of the Serbs in the late 1960s and 
through the 1980s, which led to an economic, cultural, and political shift.  Another 
example of the growing dominance of migration groups is Lebanon: 
the Lebanese civil war of 1975-90 started when Shiite Muslim population 
growth threatened Maronite Christian control over Lebanon’s national 
political institutions.66 
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Although these are only two examples, they show that shifts in the composition of 
ethnic groups may have a great influence on European external security, as it may 
become necessary for European forces to intervene to provide peace support, 
humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations.  
 
2. Impact on Sending Countries 
A fast growing population, poverty, high unemployment rates, social tension, and 
political upheaval are some of the push factors that are incentives for young people to 
leave their home country.  Although at first glance this effects the sending country 
negatively, because it loses industrious people and is drained of their small, highly 
educated elite, it has a positive effect for these countries as well.67  Considering the 
appropriate numbers as illustrated in Figure 1, one can assume that migration may 
contribute to a certain relief of social and political pressure in the sending countries.  
When emigrants are settled in the target country, they often send money remittances in 
hard currency to their families to help ease their economic situation.  When viewed from 
a political perspective, we find that returning emigrants sometimes have a chance to 
change the political situation in their home county.  Thus, liberal ideas and different ways 
of living can be considered as driving factors.  And due to modern information 
technologies, emigrants that leave their native countries due to political reasons, have the 
possibility to make their grievances public, which, in the best scenario, can lead to 
intervention by the international community.68  Examples of this are the establishment of 
democratic rules in countries of Southern Europe, such as Spain during the 1970s and 
‘80s; and, more recently, the discussion concerning human rights in Turkey, fuelled by 
their wish to be an aspirant country and to join the European Union in a few years.  
Although not directly political active in their country of choice, emigrants may 
nonetheless influence security issues in their host country or in others.  This will also be 
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the case if they support revolutionary, nationalistic, or terrorist groups in the countries of 
their origin, as is occurring at the moment in Iraq. 
So far, I have discussed the influence of migration on foreign issues.  However, 
migration within a country can be a previous step to emigration and may consequently 
influence the domestic socio-economic situation and domestic policies. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Distribution of Rural and Urban Population 
 
Such movement is closely linked to the demographic stress factor, “urbanization.”  
As illustrated in Figure 2, more than 50 percent of the population in areas of interest is 
presently in urban areas.  Furthermore, this graph demonstrates that with ongoing 
modernization, urbanization also moves on.  Whereas Europe had already long passed 
this point, the countries in the Middle East only reached this point in the mid-1960s and 
the North African countries in the mid-1980s.  It seems that, in the latter two regions, the 
process of urbanization is slowing down: the emigration rates from the countryside into 
cities are declining, and both trends are set to converge asymptotically after 2030.  
Especially in poorer countries, this trend will challenge communal governments in 
respect to city development with further challenges such as nourishment supply, water 
















































consequently less agrarian production capacities will be available.  Thus food stuffs will 
have to be imported, which will also stress the financial burden of these countries.  
Ultimately, violence caused by social unrest is a probable scenario. 
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V. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 
The previous chapters introduced and explained the key variables that determine 
the demographic development of societies.  These determining factors are responsible for 
specific trends, such as aging, urban growth, and migration, which influence not only the 
size, distribution, and composition of a society, but also their economic performance and 
security.  The trends and their implications for national security are described in this 
chapter. 
 
A. AGING VERSUS YOUTH BULGE 
1. General Development 
Looking back in history, we find that the share of people older than 65 was no 
more than 2 percent or 3 percent of the total population.69  Approximately 150 years ago, 
this situation started to gradually change and, finally populations increased dramatically 
in the mid-twentieth century.70  But the question is, what causes the process of aging that 
some societies are presently entering?  The driving force behind this trend is the mutual 
interference of falling fertility rates on the one hand and an increasing life expectancy on 
the other. 
As long as birth rates are higher or at least equal to death rates, the population 
keeps growing or stagnating respectively.  If, however, this ratio gets reversed, as is 
presently the case in developed countries, the society first starts to age and then to shrink.  
So, for example, in the four selected European countries, France, German, Italy, and 
Great Britain, as the rate of natural increase already peaked in the period between 1965-
1970, it zeroed or will zero anytime between 2000 and 2005.  The death rate will then 
become higher than the birth rate. 
In comparison to Europe, this trend looks totally different in the selected countries 
of the Middle East and the Mahgreb.  Whereas the rate of natural increase continued 
                                                 
69 CSIS Commission on Global Aging, Global Aging: The Challenge of the New Millennium, 10 
December 1999: 1, http://www.csis.org/gai/GlobalAging.pdf (accessed 6 November 2004). 
70 Ibid., 2. 
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growing for an additional 30 years in the countries of the Middle East, the rate of natural 
increase stopped growing already in the 1970s in the Mahgreb countries, while still 
remaining at a level more than seven times higher than that in Europe.  Not till the mid-
1980s in both regions did the rate of natural increase started to decline.  However, while 
the trend now is equal to that in Europe birth rates are and will remain significantly 
higher than the death rates. 
 






































































Figure 8.   Rate of Natural Increase 
 
Another phenomenon that has to be considered is the fact that, although the above 
mentioned parameter already declines, its influence affects the total size of the population 
with a certain time lag.  For example, in Germany and Italy, this effect started in the 
1970s as the population growth slowed down, stagnated, and finally started to drop 
sometime between 2000 and 2005.  Only Great Britain and France still have growing 
populations with respect to 1950.  In comparison to the European average, the situation is 
worst in Italy.  Here the population growth started to decline in approximately 2000, and 
the gradient is already becoming steeper than in the other countries: that is, the Italian 
population is shrinking faster.  Consequently, Italy’s population will reach the level of 
1950 sometime between 2040 and 2045.  
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Figure 9.   Population Growth in European Countries 
 
Again, the trend in the Middle East and the Mahgreb is working in the opposite 
direction.  As illustrated in Figure 10, these countries experienced an extremely high 











































Figure 10.   Population Growth in Developing Regions 
 
The Mahgreb grew by approximately 250 percent and the population of the 
selected  Middle  East  countries  almost  tripled.  And  this  trend   will continue  into the  
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future.  Not until 2050 this process will come to a halt.  By then, the population of these 
regions will have grown by almost 450 percent and 700 percent respectively with respect 
to the base year, 1950. 
The population growth trend results in a global process of aging and hence leads 




Figure 11.   Development of the Algerian Population from 1950 to 2050 





Figure 12.   Development of the Algerian Population from 1950 to 2050 
Source: United Nation Population Division, DESA, United Nations: World Population 
Ageing 1950-2050. 
 
                                                 
71 As the trend is the same in corresponding countries or regions respectively, the pyramid of only one 
representative country is introduced here. 
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Occupied Palestine Territory 
 
Figure 13.   Development of the Occupied Palestinian Territory’s Population 
from 1950 to 2050 
Source: United Nation Population Division, DESA, United Nations: World Population 
Ageing 1950-2050. 
 
Finally, the global median age increased from 23.6 years in 1950 to 27.4 years in 
2005 and the UN predicts it will reach 36.8 years in 2050.72  However, splitting up this 
global consideration and taking a closer look at the above mentioned countries, one has to 
realize that the situation changes significantly.  For the European countries, the average 
median age will increase from 40.5 to 59 within the next fifty years.  The same indicator 
is about to increase in the Mahgreb region from an average of 23.4 to 47 years, and for 
the selected Middle East countries, from 22.6 to 36.7 years respectively.73 
Now what are the consequences of this trend with respect to security?  First, we 
can assume that, due to a higher fraction of elderly people in combination with fewer 
younger ones, the workforce will shrink in the future, which may reduce the economic 
performance.  Furthermore, due to the increasing amount of elderly people, a higher 
portion of the obtained economic assets must be spent for welfare benefits, which will 
strain the military budget and may in the long run erode the “industrial democracies’ 
military capabilities and global presence.”74  Apart from these two domestic-related 
                                                 
72 UN Population Division, “World population prospect,” The 2002 revision population data base, 
http://esa.un.org/unpp/ (accessed 21 January 2005). 
73 Ibid. 
74 Daniel Gouré, “International Security and the Aging Crisis,” CSIS International Security Program 
(December 2000): 2, http://www.csis.org/gai/intlsecaging.pdf (accessed 6 November 2004). 
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reasons, national security is affected by the demographic trend in less developed regions, 
too.  As already described, aging in those regions will set in with a certain time lag, so 
that Europe will still be opposed by much younger societies in its direct proximity, that 
is, the youth bulge of the MENA-States.75  However, due to the socio-economic 
problems that these countries will face, caused by their huge amount of young adults, in 
the coming decades conditions of instability will emerge to threaten Europe’s vital 
economic and security interests.76  The next sections will now discuss these aspects in 
more detail. 
 
2. The Implications of Aging on the European Society 
Caused by the increasing amount of elderly people, the societies’ structure in 
regard to the age composition is about to invert.  By this process, in particular, the 
performance of industrialized countries will be significantly affected in the next decades.  
Due to declining birth rates in combination with an increasing life expectancy, the 
workforce is about to shrink.  This trend is worsened by two effects.  First, in 
industrialized countries, and especially in Europe, young people enjoy a high-level and 
long-lasting education, which results in their accessing the labor market at higher ages.  
At the other end of a professional career, those workers retire much earlier than necessary 
as they are required to do by the official retirement age of 65.  So the theoretically 
available workforce between the ages of 15 and 64, is being additionally reduced.  Thus, 
assuming an access into the labor market at an average age of 20 and retirement at the 
age of 60, the French workforce for example, will be affected by a decline of 
approximately 10 percent over the next five decades.  The German, Italian, and British 
labor forces will shrink by approximately 21, 41.5 and 12 percent, respectively. 
 
                                                 
75 MENA: Middle East and North Africa. 
76 Daniel Gouré, “International Security and the Aging Crisis,” CSIS International Security Program 
(December 2000): 2, http://www.csis.org/gai/intlsecaging.pdf (accessed 6 November 2004). 
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Labor Force France Germany Italy Great 
Britain
2005 33073 45178 32034 32371
2050 29734 35718 18750 28366
absolute 
decline -3339 -9460 -13284 -4005
relative 
decline [%] -10.1 -20.9 -41.5 -12.4  
Table 1. Decline of Labor Force in 1000 
 
This dramatic decline of labor force has a far-reaching influence not only on the 
fiscal situation, but also on the competition between industry and the military to recruit 
highly qualified personnel. 
Because of the above highlighted reduction of the workforce, fewer workers will 
be available in the future to produce goods and services.  Even in the case of higher 
productivity and further technological progress, it remains questionable, whether they can 
compete for a probable shortfall of supply that undercuts domestic demand.  If this 
scenario turns out to be true, increasing prices resulting in higher wages, on the one hand, 
and an increasing need of imports, on the other hand, may be likely.77  When viewed 
from the micro-economic point of view, a shrinking workforce seems to lead to 
overcapacities as demand declines.  And/or, since an aging society has “different 
preferences and needs than a younger population,” product demand may change and the 
production of goods and services has to be adapted accordingly.78  In a worst-case 
scenario, such a “labor force contraction could depress economic output, boost inflation 
and curb investments.”79 
                                                 
77 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Long-Term Global Demographic Trends: Reshaping the 
Geopolitical Landscape, Eldis Gateway to Development Information (July 2001): 25, 
http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC9390.htm (accessed 6 November 2004). 
78 Axel Börsch-Supan, “Global Aging Issues, Answers, More Questions,” Mannheim Research 
Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA), University of Mannheim, Germany (July 2004): 21, 
http://www.mea.uni-mannheim.de/mea_neu/pages/files/nopage_pubs/1i2ingsuenc0skcz_dp55.pdf 
(accessed 6 November 2004). 
79 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Long-Term Global Demographic Trends: Reshaping the 
Geopolitical Landscape, Eldis Gateway to Development Information (July 2001): 24, 
http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC9390.htm (accessed 6 November 2004). 
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Within this context, the U.S. defense expert Daniel Gouré, Deputy Director of the 
International Security Program of CSIS, emphasizes that official projections of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimate that the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates of the European Union will decline by 0.4 
percent per annum during the time period between 2000 and 2025, and of annually 0.9 
percent between 2025 to 2050.80  The consequences of this development will be not only 
reduced future GDP growth rates, but also reductions in tax revenues.  Such occurrence, 
will lead inevitably to problems in funding social welfare beneficiaries and retirement 
payments caused by the increasing number of pensioners. 
Whereas today between 2.2 and 2.6 workers support one pensioner, in 2050 only 
1.4 workers will be available to support one pensioner.  The situation is even worse in 




France Great Britain Germany Italy
2005 0.38 0.38 0.45 0.45
2050 0.71 0.71 0.77 1.00  
Table 2. Old-Age Dependency Ratio 
 
Hence, it is fair to assume that the burden of the European social welfare systems 
will increase and that more money will have to be spent for social benefits.  These 
budgetary challenges were examined by the Aging Working Group (AWG) of the 
European Policy Committee (EPC) in a very detailed way.  Based on an assumption that 
the current policy scenario can be taken for granted, this working group projects an 
increase in spending on public pensions for Germany from 11.8 percent in 2000 to 16.9 
percent in 2050 of the GDP at the time, respectively.81  With respect to the expected 
increase of public expenditures on health care, the AWG predicts an increase from 5.7 
                                                 
80 Daniel Gouré, “International Security and the Aging Crisis,” CSIS International Security Program 
(December 2000): 4-5, http://www.csis.org/gai/intlsecaging.pdf (accessed 6 November 2004). 
81 Economic Policy Committee (EPC), The impact of aging on public finances: overview of analysis 
carried out at EU level and proposals for a future work programme, (Brussels, 22 October 2003), 14. 
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percent in 2000 to 7.1 or 7.8 percent in 2050 as share of GDP, depending on whether a 
GDP-per-capita or a GDP-per-worker cost assumption is applied.82  Since these data are 
used in the next chapter, which discusses the military budgets of different European 
nations, they are presented and explained in deeper detail. 
Thus, considering the future scenario, it is obvious that European countries will 
have to deal with severe financial problems and demography-related challenges.  And the 
fiscal situation is further strained by additional military budget requests necessary for 
transforming and adapting the armed forces to new threats and tasks mostly resulting 
from demographic changes in potentially unstable regions.  Such budgetary needs can be 
justified in two ways.  First, competition between industry and the military will intensify 
in the recruitment of highly qualified and motivated personnel.  The personnel 
requirements are important because, due to the declining scale of the workforce, industry 
has to increase its productivity by using more sophisticated technology, and the military 
has to compensate for lacking personnel by a dependence on modern technology as well.  
The military’s request for higher-qualified personnel is additionally justified by 
requirements like minimally invasive assaults, minimal collateral damages, and as few of 
their own casualties as possible.  To achieve these goals, modern technology and its safe 
and correct handling is mandatory. 
These aspects and their constraints on military budgets will be discussed later in 
more detail.  First, however, it is necessary to understand the influence of the key 
demographic variables on the Middle Eastern and North African populations. 
 
3. The Implications of the Youth Bulge on Developing Countries 
From the point of view of industrialized countries, a large number of young, 
educated adults in combination with appropriate labor demands is a “demographic 
bonus” to economic growth and increasing prosperity.83  However, in countries where 
                                                 
82 Economic Policy Committee (EPC), Budgetary challenges posed by aging populations: the impact 
on public spending on pensions, health and long-term care for the elderly and possible indicators of the 
long-term sustainability of public finances, (Brussels, 24 October 2001), 42-44. 
83 Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman, and Daniele Anastasion, The Security Demographic: 
Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War, (Washington D.C., Population Action International, 
2003), 42. 
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economy is underdeveloped and employment possibilities are rare, an over proportionate 
number of young adults may result in socio-economic strains and violence.84  Some 
countries, especially those on the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, need to see 
experience a dramatic increase of their younger people, aged between 15 and 29, over the 
next 20 years.  Most countries affected by the youth bulge, however, are not prepared to 
handle this challenge.  Many of those have weak economies, and institutional and 
political constraints as well that prevent investments or discourage private economic 
activities necessary to generate a greater number of jobs.85  According to the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), the unemployment rate of “young semi-
educated” adults living in cities in the Middle East, is most severe.  According to the 
ILO, this is the result of too few entry-level jobs combined with higher expectations and a 
“reluctant behavior to take manual low-status jobs.”86 
To illustrate the present circumstances of economic development and the number 
of young adults in the selected European and MENA countries, I compiled pertinent data 
from the IMF data base.  As shown in the graph below, the growth of youth in Europe87 
declines with respect to the year 1980, but the GDP per capita88 increases over-
proportionately.  This situation looks totally different in the selected MENA countries. 
Here, in the selected countries of the Middle East and the Mahgreb,89 the number 
of young adults approximately doubled over the last 25 years.  During the same period, 
however, economic growth, measured in GDP per capita, developed in an opposite 
direction. 
                                                 
84 Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman, and Daniele Anastasion, The Security Demographic: 
Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War, (Washington D.C., Population Action International, 
2003), 41. 
85 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Long-Term Global Demographic Trends: Reshaping the 
Geopolitical Landscape, Eldis Gateway to Development Information (July 2001): 37, 
http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC9390.htm (accessed 6 November 2004). 
86 Ibid., 37. 
87 France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom. 
88 GDP data are compiled from GDP in current prices and in US $. 
89 Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel (GDP data are not available for Iraq and 
Palestine, Israel as out layer excluded). 
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In the Middle East the GDP per capita first declined and then started to increase 
from 1990 on, whereas the Mahgreb countries experienced negative growth with respect 
to 1980.  So the GDP per capita of the Middle East grew by 60 percent over the last 
twenty-five years, but, in contrast to that region, the GDP per capita of the Mahgreb 
countries dropped 25 percent below the level of 1980.  
 
 
Figure 14.   Growth Rate of Young Adults and GDP per Capita 
 
The consequence of the above-illustrated situation is a high unemployment rate in 
these countries.  And the unemployment rate of young male adults is three to five times 
higher than that of all adults.  Moreover, young adults tend to suffer lengthy period of 
unemployment between the end of their education and their “first placement in a job.”90 
This occurrence of slow or no economic growth, combined with a high fraction of 
young adults in the total population, puts the related governments under severe pressure.   
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An inadequate integration of the youth into the economic process may lead to further 
political “destabilization, ethnic wars, revolutions and anti-regime activities.”91 
Thus, many scholars link the unrests of the 1970s and 1980s in Turkey, Algeria, 
Egypt, Iran, and even Ireland to the existence of a huge youth bulge.92  A high 
unemployment rate combined with low education is being held responsible for conditions 
that finally led to coups in 1971 and 1980.  Algeria’s youth bulge, for example, 
contributed to a riot, allegedly because of an absence of “adequate education, 
employment and housing opportunities.”  According to the CIA’s Long-Term 
Demographic Global Trends, Algeria’s unemployment rate is higher than 30 percent.  
Egypt is mentioned in the same context, because the same mechanisms there as in 
Algeria contribute to violence.  Moreover, an Egyptian scientist cited claims that 
graduates from universities especially, who are looking for jobs, are discontent and 
impatient with the social-economic situation, and therefore are potential candidates to 
become “Islamic radicals.”93  Even the fall of the Shah and the subsequent seizure of 
power by the Ayatollah regime in Iran can be included in this context of rioting youth and 
the “street politics of 1977-79.”  An analysis of the pertinent demographic data of the 
mid- 1970s shows that “half of Iran’s population was under 16 and two-thirds was under 
30.”94  An example for Western Europe mentioned in the CIA report is the conflict 
between Catholics and Protestants in North Ireland.  It argues that one of the reasons for 
the riots was the intense activity by the Catholic population of Ulster, due to its younger 
age structure.95  
According to a U.S. government study, such events are more likely to happen, and 
the probability increases, if the ratio of young adults aged 15 to 29 years with respect to 
cohorts aged between 30 and 54 is greater than 1.27.96  Other scholars, who also have 
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investigated the relationship between youth and the likelihood of violent conflicts 
developed further assessment ratios.  Among them, scientists at Population Action 
International (PAI) developed a ratio that compares cohorts aged 15 to 29 with cohorts of 









Using that ratio and Christian Mesquida’s work (University of York, Canada), 
PAI further derived a stress benchmark expressing the risk of violent actions.  This 
benchmark consists of four risk categories and is illustrated in Table 3. 
 
Category Stress Level Proportion of Young Adults [%] 
4 Extreme 50>  
3 High 5040 <≤ x  
2 Medium 4030 <≤ x  
1 Low 30<  
 
Table 3. Stress Level Categories 
Source: Population Action International: The Security Demographic 
 
Mallory developed the so-called young male ratio in 1970.  He argues that the 
most volatile parts of the population are young males.  Therefore, his ratio expresses the 
quotient of young adults, again aged between 15 and 29 years with respect to adults of 30 
years and older.98 
                                                 
97 Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman, and Daniele Anastasion, The Security Demographic: 
Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War, (Washington D.C., Population Action International, 
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However, in the following outlook, only the first two ratios are used to examine 
probable future stress levels.  Herewith, the given figures represent the change in the 
stress level caused by the youth bulge according to the PAI definition in Table 3 caused.  
The two years considered are 2005 and 2025.  The yes or no represents the assessment of 
the U.S. government whether destabilization, ethnic wars, revolutions, and anti regime 
activities are likely to increase with respect to the present situation. 
 
 
Figure 15.   Change of Stress Level from 2005 to 2025 
(After) Population Action International: The Demographic Security 
 
Evaluating the results, this graphic shows that except for Mauritania, Palestine, 
and Iraq, the stress levels in all other countries decline from high to medium.  In regard to 
demographic development in Syria, the stress level even falls from extreme to medium, 
and that of Lebanon and Israel from medium to low.  This decline could be explained by 
the process of aging that also affects these countries.  However, the influence of a high 
number of young adults on violence per se can still be assessed for the Mahgreb countries 
and the Middle East on average as medium.  Taking into account the results of the 
application of the ratio defined by the U.S. government, the probability of risk changes 







































remain unchanged in the future: that is, it will keep the level it has today.  The countries 
with the highest probability of instability are Mauritania and Palestine.  Their ratios will 
remain equal to 1.13 and 1.16 respectively in 2025.  So, although aging starts to dampen 
the violent potential of young adults, one must bare in mind that the total population 
keeps on growing.  In sum, this region will remain an area of instability for the next 
generation. 
One aspect that is not considered in the above discussed ratios, but that 
contributes to instability and social unrest, is urbanization and its rapid growth.  Strongly 
linked with that problematic is the competition for resources like arable land and water.  
This trend and its implications are discussed in the following chapter. 
 
B. URBANIZATION AND URBAN GROWTH 
Technically speaking, urbanization is just “the process by which large numbers of 
people become permanently concentrated in relatively small areas, forming cities.”99  
Therefore, urbanization can be seen as a result of migration movements – the third key 
demographic variable – at the expense of the rural portion of the population.  Thus, while 
urbanization is the core of societal development, and therefore jointly responsible for 
economic growth, technological progress, health improvement, and education, it also 
links the countries by communication and ties up international relations.  In other words, 
urbanization can also be considered as a trigger for globalization.100 
However, urbanization is a two-edged blade.  As I already pointed out briefly in 
Chapter IV, urbanization represents a demographic stress factor, too.  According to 
official estimations 50 percent of the world population will live in urban areas, at the 
latest, in 2015.  As this trend is closely linked with the level of societal development, that 
situation already occurred approximately at the beginning of the 20th century in France, 
Germany, Italy, and, the United Kingdom.  Even the MENA countries already achieved 
this level of urbanization between the middle of the 1960s and the 1980s, and this trend 
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shifts further toward the developing countries.101  So, in former times almost all big cities 
were in industrialized countries, but already today that situation has changed, so that only 
one fifth of the 20 cities with more than 10 million inhabitants are still in the developed 
world.  To underline this argument, Cairo can be taken as an example.  Its population 
grew from 2.1 million in 1950 to 10.5 million in 2000 and is predicted to reach 14.4 
million in 2015.  This is equivalent to an annual growth rate of 3 percent whereas the 
same index for European capitals shows stagnation in average over the last 25 years.102 
Comparing these figures with the urban growth rates of European cities and with 
one of the MENA countries, and considering their differences in economic growth as 
well, illustrates how much higher the burden of this region must be in order to cope with 
the problems emerging from urbanization.  For example, the average urban growth rate of 
approximately 2 percent per annum in the MENA countries may lead to the exhaustion of 
resources and consequently to severe supply problems.  Above all, one may not forget 
that most of these countries’ territory consists of desert and only scarce water resources 
are available, which means that only small fractions of land are arable, despite the use of 
irrigation methods.  But as already shown in Figure 10, the population of this area is still 
growing and this process will not stop until 2050.  So the process will cause even more 
consumption of resources such as land and water, and the financial burden to secure 
support for the population by imports will increase. 
In case economic growth is not able to produce sufficient assets to provide the 
necessary development of urban infrastructure, like sewage systems, health clinics, 
schools, transportation, housing and industrial areas, environmental problems, declining 
living conditions, and slum building due to a steady stream of new residents from the 
countryside is inevitable. 
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102 United Nations, “UN-Habitat,” United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 
http://www.unchs.org/programmes/guo/table11.asp?countrycode=818 (accessed 10 February 2005). 
49 
This combination of economic weakness and young people’s high expectations 
and disappointed hopes may suddenly result in riots and upheavals.103  Although cities 
tend to be multicultural, “bringing together different ethnic groups and religions into 
close social contact,” mutually benevolent attitudes may change completely under the 
pressure of socio-economic competition.104  According to PAI, criminal activities, social 
protest, and labor unrest in urban areas were the main reasons for ethnic and religious 
conflicts during the 20th centuries.105  Such explosive situations may contribute, 
especially in Muslim countries, to a hotbed for extremists who may exploit the situation 
in order to “accelerate violent campaigns against secular governments and their 
supporters.”106 
To determine the correlation between rapid urban growth and civil conflicts, the 
PAI institute developed a stress level index based on the growth rates for the period from 
1990 to 1995 similar to the risk assessment concerning the youth bulge. 
Again, the countries were divided into several categories, each representing a 
different stress level.  Herewith, the chosen benchmark of 4 percent or higher, referring to 
the high and extreme stress-level category, represents the economic growth of “high-
performing economies.”  In contrast to that, the level of 1 percent or below, chosen for 




                                                 
103 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Long-Term Global Demographic Trends: Reshaping the 
Geopolitical Landscape, Eldis Gateway to Development Information (July 2001): 60, 
http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC9390.htm (accessed 6 November 2004). 
104 Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman, and Daniele Anastasion, The Security Demographic: 
Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War, (Washington D.C., Population Action International, 
2003), 51. 
105 Ibid., 52. 
106 Brian Nichiporuk, Regional Demographics and the War on Terrorism, RAND Population Matters 
(2000): 23, http://www.rand.org/publications/RP/RP1057/RP1057.pdf (accessed 6 November 2004). 
107 Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman, and Daniele Anastasion, The Security Demographic: 
Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War, (Washington D.C., Population Action International, 
2003), 89. 
50 
Category Stress Level 
Urban Growth 
Rate per annum 
[%] 
3 High, Extreme 4>  
2 Medium 41 <≤ x  
1 Low 1<  
 
Table 4. Stress Level Categories 
Source: Population Action International: The Security Demographic 
 
In addition, the likelihood of an outbreak of civil conflict was calculated, using a 
set of countries that experienced a “newly initiated civil conflict” in the period between 
1990 and 2000.  The urban growth rate thereby correlates to the above mentioned 
categories of stress level.  The results show that the likelihood of civil conflicts will 
increase by 100 percent, if the stress level caused by the annual urban growth rate 
increases from level 2 to 3.108 
 
 
Figure 16.   Average Annual Urban Growth Rate 1985 - 2015 
(After) Population Action International: The Demographic Security 
 
                                                 























This method is now applied to the present and future situation of urban growth in 
the MENA countries’ capitals.  However, as possible future conflicts cannot be foreseen, 
the specification of appropriate conflict probabilities does not take place.  So only the 
stress levels are predicted, which are based on and compiled from appropriate data sets 
from UNCHS data sources. 
Setting the results illustrated in Figure 16 in relation to the benchmarks given in 
Table 3, the stress caused by the different urban growth rates can be assessed equal to 
level 2 almost all over the region.  The only exception among the chosen capitals is 
Beirut, the stress level of which correlates to category 3.  Although, almost all countries 
can be assigned to category 2, many of them represent stress levels in the upper half of 
this category.  As, however, civil conflicts may arise in this environment at any time for 
any reason, this region still represents a certain factor of instability.109 
Among others, the supply problems resulting from scarcity of water and arable 
land were already briefly mentioned in this chapter.  Although these problems are not the 
main focus of this discussion, they nonetheless contribute to and are jointly responsible 
for the instability in the Middle East and North Africa, and therefore have great impact on 
security issues.  So, in the upcoming chapter, this issue will be introduced. 
 
C. DRAIN ON RESOURCES – WATER AND ARABLE LAND 
The last known war over water happened 4,500 years ago.  It was fought between 
the city-states of Umma and Lagash in Mesopotamia, which today is in southern Iraq.110  
But whereas many wars were fought over land in the past, threatening conflicts about 
water resources were solved by contracts.  Consequently, during the last 820 years, more 
than 3,600 water-related treaties were signed.111  As can be seen from this large number 
of treaties, historically, water rights were obviously often a reason for struggle. 
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However, although the affected countries were able to solve those problems 
peacefully in the past, that is no guarantee that this will happen in the future, too.  This 
point is all the more valid as, in contrast to population, available water resources have not 
increased since the Mesopotamian days, with the consequence that many countries with 
scarce water resources are pressing against the limits of water availability.112 
In the context of urbanization, the impact of water scarcity on security has two 
dimensions, a domestic one and an international one.  Although urbanization can be seen 
as a driving factor for modernization and progress, it also stresses the water and arable 
land resources that are needed to produce food.  So, water scarcity and droughts may 
result in internal socio-economic tensions or conflicts, caused by the competition for 
distribution.  If the fresh-water resources in a country’s own territory are not sufficient, 
additional water has to be taken from river systems.  This, however, contains a potential 
risk of international crises, as it influences the availability of water in neighboring 
countries, too. 
Among others, this is especially valid for the MENA countries.  As most of their 
territory consists of desert, they are heavily dependent on irrigation.  So dam projects, 
built by one country are watched very carefully.  One example is Turkey’s Greater 
Anatolia Project.  The dams and irrigation systems built in the upper reaches of the Tigris 
and Euphrates affect the water supply of Syria and Iraq by 40 percent and 60 – 80 
percent, respectively.113  Syria and Iraq also, are two countries with a predicted 
considerable population growth over the next decade.  Iraq is expected to grow by 28.8 
percent during the next ten years, whereas Syria’s growth rate is prognosticated as 23.4 
percent.  Both countries will double their population size in 2005 within the time period 
between 2040 and 2050.  But during the next ten years, the Turkish population will also 
grow by 12 percent.114 
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Another example that may contribute to international tensions is the water 
situation in Egypt.  “Egypt depends on the Nile river water for 97% of its renewable fresh 
water supply.”115  Egypt still draws most of its water supply from the Nile, as was 
assured by a treaty of 1959.  Countries like Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania, are 
also growing considerably and develop their own plans to draw water from the Blue and 
White Nile to satisfy their own increasing needs for arable and irrigated land.116 
 



































Figure 17.   Renewable Water Resources per Capita 
 
To illustrate the water situation in the MENA countries in total, the Figure 17 
shows the average development of renewable water resources per capita over the next 
forty-five years.  Due to the increase of population, the water resources in the Middle 
East will decline by almost 50 percent and already low resources in the selected North 
African countries, by almost 35 percent.  The countries with the lowest resources are 
Jordan, Israel and Libya.  These countries have only an availability of renewable water of 
157 m³, 255 m³, and 106 m³ per capita per annum, respectively.  Libya drills wells in 
order to exploit “fossil water,” as its annual consumption is higher than 100 percent of its 
renewable resources. 
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PAI also developed a benchmark for this stress categories.  According to the 
Institute, the stress level caused by water scarcity is extremely high, and in all the 
selected countries the availability of renewable fresh-water resources is less than 1,667 
m³ per capita.117 
Similar, but not as dramatic, is the situation concerning cropland.  Although in the 
above mentioned regions, cropland has to be developed mostly by irrigation, the 
production of food can be increased by using better technologies, such as gene-
manipulated seeds.  Furthermore, the worldwide production of grain will still be adequate 
in the future to supply the increased world population.118  However, the problem of 
distribution, transportation, and the threat of droughts and famines will also remain 
existent, although according to PAI, the considered countries’ stress levels will be 
consistent to category 2 in the near future.119  With an availability of cropland between 
0.21 and less than 0.35 hectare per capita, the risk of outbreaks of civil or even 
international conflicts is assessed as rather low.  However, according to a report of the 
U.S. National Intelligence Council, the risk of famines in combination with suppressive 
governments and/or internal conflicts and natural disasters may lead to the prevention of 
or limited relief efforts by third nations, as happened in Somalia in the early 1990s.120 
In order to proceed in the same sequence as above, the average availability of 
cropland per capita is shown in Figure 18.  Although, as already mentioned above, PAI 
assesses the stress level by category 2 and the risk of civil conflicts, caused by 
competition for cropland, as rather low, this situation has to be reassessed, concerning the 
future development.  Already in 2015, the stress level for the Middle Eastern countries 
will shift to category 3 and the Mahgreb countries will follow in 2040 respectively.121 
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Figure 18.   Cropland per Capita 
 
So in sum it can be argued that, although the security in the above mentioned 
regions was not yet affected by civil conflicts and upheavals caused by water or cropland 
scarcity, the situation cannot be eased drastically in the future, as these resources are 
naturally limited.  Therefore, the risk potential is likely to increase. 
 
D. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATION ON FUTURE 
CONFLICTS 
By referencing three key demographic variables - fertility, mortality, and 
migration – I have illustrated the development of industrialized versus developing 
countries in select European countries and some in the Middle East and Northern Africa.  
In one section, I discussed pertinent trends caused by those variables: aging versus a 
youth bulge, urbanization combined with rapid urban growth and scarcity of natural 
renewable resources.  Those trends now affect security issues in three ways: 
First, due to countries’ differential growth rates and the resulting age composition, 
their available sources of national power change.  Second, socio-economic stress, the 
ethnic compositions and differences in the culture of societies, caused for example by 
internal and external factors like forced or voluntary migration, often give rise to new 
sources of conflict.  And, last but not least, the very nature of conflict itself may also 
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change in the future.  To a large extent, urbanization and its rapid growth rate are seen as 
principle driving factors. 
The following sections comprise a more detailed deliberation of the demographic 
trends and their implications for future conflicts and countries’ internal and external 
security. 
 
1. Demography and Future Conflicts 
Looking into the future, demographers predict not only falling birth rates and 
consequently shrinking societies, but also an increase in the number of people who will 
live in an urban environment.  Taking into account the ongoing transition process and 
demographers’ projections, researchers show that more than 70 percent of the population 
in the Middle East and the Mahgreb countries will live in urban areas in 2010 (see Figure 
7), and this trend will proceed further.  The incentives for people to move into urban 
centers are manifold.  Among others, scholars have identified incentives like greater 
access to information and the perception of an urban area as economic center of gravity.  
Societal events that contribute to urbanization include rural devastation, one’s loss of 
economic existence in a rural area, and high birth rates with lower infant mortality.  
Government- and conflict-generated migration are also named as triggering issues.122  
Consequently, urbanization changes not only the “physical geography” of an area but 
also “human beings socially, psychologically and behaviorally.”123  That urban areas 
have become the center of countries’ economic and political infrastructure means a shift 
also in the huge burden and responsibility of political leaders.  Especially in less 
developed and undeveloped countries, governments must increasingly deal with 
overcrowding, socio-economic stress, issues involving ethnic compositions of societies 
and differences in culture, slum building, pollution, transportation bottlenecks, 
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unemployment, low budgets, and man-made disasters.124  Hence, as the physical and 
social-economic environment of a population is influenced by this trend, the process of 
urbanization may create a hotbed for social tension and conflict.  According to Brian 
Nichiporuk, a RAND defense specialist, this described development also leads to the 
emergence of new “strategic means” such as “ethnic diasporas and the manipulation of 
natural resource availabilities.”125  Considering these entire changes one can deduce that, 
if the environment changes, the character of future conflicts is likely to change as well. 
 
a. The Physical Environment 
In the past, urban warfare was extremely lethal and costly and was 
therefore avoided as far as possible.  However, with a proceeding differential growth in 
military technology, experts have diagnosed a shift toward asymmetric warfare, in which 
urban warfare can be used by adversaries to nullify the technological advantage of the 
other side in a “high-intensity conflict.”  In such an environment, “firepower and 
maneuver,” the “primal variables of military operations,” will be extremely limited.126  
This terrain offers many opportunities for “ambushes, snipers and booby-traps,”127 as 
multistoried buildings with basements offer numerous possibilities to maneuver in the 
third dimension.128  Sewer systems and underground tunnels may serve as transit routes 
“entirely out of sight of the attacker.”129  In addition, cratered streets and barricades 
“channel attacking forces into the killing zone,” becoming further obstacles in urban 
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warfare.130  Buildings can be used as platforms, making even armored vehicles more 
vulnerable: they can be attacked from different angles, from which the less-armored 
upper sides can be penetrated more easily.131 
In addition, to avoid large collateral damage, precision-guided weapons 
must be used.  Urban environments also provide adversaries with an incentive to use 
cultural monuments as cover and to take civilians as hostages and use them as human 
shields.  Due to the natural “blindness” of city streets, this terrain makes it easy to wage 
guerilla warfare and thus shift the balance of power.132 
Similar arguments are valid in the case of low-intensity conflicts.  Here 
too, the urban environment favors guerilla tactics, terrorist attacks, and sabotage of 
government facilities and foreign troops.  At the same time, this environment makes it 
easy for militant groups to disappear, as the distinction between the regular population 
and adversaries blurs.133 
In sum, many argue that the demographic trend of urbanization will lead 
to an increasing importance of urban warfare.  In this terrain, current close-support 
weapon systems munitions, battle management, command, control, communications, 
computers and intelligence (BMC4I) are severely limited and have to be tailored to these 
types of missions.134 
 
b. New Strategic Means 
A further threat that is used as a new means in conflict is transnational 
terrorism.  The U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) emphasizes that in states with 
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weak governments, ethnic, cultural, and religious tensions provide an environment for 
terrorist groups.  Weak economies and uncontrolled and permeable borders also 
contribute to this volatile situation.135  However, in the same context the NIC indicates 
that the trend for government-supported or -sponsored terrorism dwindles.  Instead, 
terrorism develops to “free-wheeling” transnational networks.136 
The other aspects of change that will affect the character of future 
conflicts are the use of ethnic or religious motivated diasporas and the scarcity of 
renewable resources to achieve political goals.  Although, diasporas per se are not new, 
their use as strategic means during conflict, due to modern information technology, 
attaches new importance to them.  On the one hand, diasporas can be used as fundraising 
organizations abroad, so weapons can be bought in the region of conflict.  On the other 
hand, members of diasporas living abroad have access to modern education, and can use 
their newly acquired knowledge against the host nation to stir up trouble by so-called 
“non-lethal” attacks.137  Furthermore, due to the widespread distribution of the internet, 
diasporas can use it to hide their activities as deployed planning cells for terrorist groups.  
In the worst case, even scenarios are imaginable, in which such occurrences may not only 
lead to remote intra- or interstate conflicts but also contribute that the conflict may spill 
over to a host country where appropriate diasporas are established.138 
However, ethnic groups may also use modern media in other ways than 
having a negative impact on international relations.  Modern media offers these groups 
the possibility to call attention to grievances in their home countries, hoping that the 
international community will pressure those governments or even will intervene to try to 
stabilize the situation in the home country. 
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Another instrument of new strategic means that bears great risk are 
conflicts induced by competition over renewable resources, especially water.  As these 
resources are becoming scarcer on the same scale as population growth, the risk of 
groups using them for coercion against other countries increases.139 
In short, the nature of conflict is presently undergoing a changing 
momentum in keeping with the changes in demographic development.  Whereas in 
former times wars were mainly waged on battlefields, this has already changed.  Due to 
an increasing degree of urbanization and globalization, caused by the proliferation of 
modern information technology, the environment of conflict and its strategic means are 
changing. 
Consequently, the changes in the nature of conflict have to be considered 
not only by military planners but also to a much greater degree by governments, 
responsible for the necessary successful transformation process and the appropriate 
equipping of armed forces to meet these new challenges. 
However, although the demographic impact on the character of future 
conflicts will have its most visible impact on armed forces, other aspects also have to be 
considered.  In cases in which governments and international security organizations 
decide to intervene in other countries, for example, by peace support, humanitarian 
assistance, or disaster relief operations, also changes in sources of national power and the 
sources of conflicts induced by future demographic development have to be taken into 
account.  These aspects are examined in the following two chapters. 
 
2. Changes in Sources of National Power 
In times when conflicts were fought by means of less technologically developed 
weapons, there was a direct link between size of population and power of the appropriate 
political entity.  However, as progress in technology occurred and industrialization 
moved on, manpower was replaced by technology and tactics had to be adapted to the 
new capabilities.  So armies which were outnumbered were suddenly able to dominate 
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and win wars or battles. The Prussian army at Königgrätz in 1866 and the German 
Wehrmacht during the first half of WWII are classic examples. 
This relationship between technology and demography will become even more 
important in the future, as the changing demographics of developed and developing 
countries drift in opposite directions.  This trend already influences and will continue to 
influence the sources of national power of “high-population-growth” and “low-
population-growth” countries.140 
With respect to the here chosen four European countries and reflecting again on 
Figure 9, it becomes obvious that the number of young people the military can draw from 
in the future will become smaller and smaller, at least for the next 25 years.  Overall the 
German population aged 18 to 23 will decrease by 19.85 percent.  Italy will experience a 
decline of 25.15 percent during the same time.  In France and Great Britain the situation 
is not so dramatic, but those countries have to cope with a decline also of young adults 
aged 18 to 23 years, of 4.75 percent and 9.55 percent respectively.  After 2030 however, 
the situation stabilizes and a slight increase is predicted.  Again, Italy is the exception.  Its 
appropriate population will continue to decline to an overall of 25 percent.  This problem 
becomes more challenging politically as well, as Germany and Italy still rely on conscript 
forces, and the question of draft justice, already latently present, may become more 
urgent. 
Consequently, the forces of “low-growth states” have to “shift from manpower-
intensive to capital-intensive forces.”141  To the same degree that the technological 
capabilities increase in the forces, the better and more intensively the soldiers have to be 
educated and trained, so that each soldier on the battlefield becomes a more and more 
precious “good”.  And all possible has to be done to protect him and support him, with 
the best available weapon systems and technology.142 
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Demographically, however, the above scenarios clash with countries in a state of 
socio-economic crisis.  To the same extent that the number of young adults decreases, the 
number of elderly people increases.  So, more future money has to be invested into the 
social welfare system.  Additionally, the financial situation of these countries is further 
stressed by steadily increasing prices for modern weapon systems.  Many force systems 
have to be modernized and reintroduced into the military in accordance with the NATO 
Defense Capabilities Initiative and the European Capabilities Action Plan, such as, for 
example, airlift capacities, orbit-based surveillance and intelligence sensors, and 
precision-guided ammunition.  It becomes obvious that no European country will be able 
to finance all these requirements on a national basis. 
As far as countries with high population growth rates are concerned, their forces 
have to struggle with a different set of problems.  While the quality of forces is no issue 
in industrialized countries, it is a looming one in the countries of the Middle East and 
North Africa.  In general, these countries lack the money to “field, maintain, and operate 
the types of advanced, integrated weapon systems often necessary for success in modern 
conventional warfare.”143 
Consequently, these countries must try to compensate for those deficits.  
According to a RAND research paper, they have “incentives to [develop and] depend on 
weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and a small number of elite conventional warfare 
divisions for external conflicts.”144 
However, according to Brian Nichiporuk’s research, there are three factors that 
drive countries with high population growth rates to maintain large forces. First, he 
argues, due to their poor economic situations these countries draft more people into the 
military, to reduce the high unemployment rates.  The result is more social stability.  
Furthermore, their forces are used in ways similar to Europe during the process of nation 
building, as school of nation to foster social cohesion.  This is especially important in 
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regions where different ethnic groups, cultures, and religions meet.  A third factor he 
identifies is the use of armed forces to provide internal security and to protect the 
government.145 
In sum, the different demographic developments in the identified regions change 
the sources of national power to such an extent that industrialized countries have to 
undergo a transition process from labor-intensive to technical-intensive forces due to 
rapidly aging and shrinking societies. In regions where the trend is the opposite, huge 
forces are maintained for internal stability and security reasons, but unaffordable high-
tech systems as well. 
 
3. Changes in Sources of Conflict 
Because similar regions develop in a similar way, the growth rate per se does not 
necessarily change the conventional regional balance of power.  Rather, it is the indirect 
influence of variables such as migration, competition for scarce resources, and 
differential growth rates that is the destabilizing factor. 146 
As to some extent Chapter IV illustrates, migration influences regional security in 
several ways.  So migration may be forced for economic reasons.  It may be triggered, for 
example, by factors such as scarce resources, bad harvests, and land overuse due to too 
many people who have to live from a certain piece of land, which may result in turn 
famines.147  Incentive factors are also important.  In urban areas, the people who suffer 
the hardships hope for better living conditions and desire jobs in the cities.  Depending on 
the economic capability of the country, migration may have negative repercussions in 
respect to security, increasing cities’ higher financial burden.  The need to improve the 
local infrastructure and to avoid slum building rests on the local officials.  Furthermore, 
the food and supply situation may also be stress factors, especially if the incoming                                                  
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migration coincides with supply shortages.  Spontaneous violence may be triggered by 
such events, as happened in Algeria in 1988 due to increasing food prices, and in Jordan 
in 1996 during the “bread riots.”148  Depending on the local “strength of Islamic 
organizations, the alienation among the masses,” the level of friction between minorities 
and majorities, and the “rate of social policy changes,” triggered riots may accelerate into 
civil war or revolution.149 
Migration also can influence international relations among states, which may 
deteriorate to the point of “interstate warfare.”150  In a case where the internal migration 
of an ethnic group leads to settlements in border regions of a neighboring country where 
a number of the same ethnic group already live, the situation can fuel endeavors to unite 
and to build their own state.  Furthermore, migration may lead to a situation similar to 
colonization, if borders are permeable and refugees are able to settle down in unoccupied 
regions in a neighboring country.151  These two stress factors may further contribute to 
changes in ethnic compositions which again, depending on the number of the refugees 
and migrants, may increase the risk of encouraging nationalist movements in the host 
country.152 
Migration also has the potential to spill over into neighboring countries.153  
Anticipation of that happening, however, can be used by more aggressive states to pursue 
their own political interests.  Brian Nichiporuk mentioned three of them: preservation of 
cultural homogeneity, “elimination of politically troublesome groups from the body 
politics,” and exertion of pressure on neighboring countries.154 
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Although these are all domestic security issues, they have the potential to affect 
the international community in two ways.  First of all, the international community may 
be forced to intervene to prevent further spreading of violence.  That, in turn, leads to an 
“increasing pressure for peace support, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
operations.”155  On the other hand, countries that are traditional regional allies of 
“Western states,” may forsake their own support to them, to prevent their own 
destabilization, or if regional pressure of neighboring countries becomes too strong.156 
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VI. EUROPEAN SECURITY PERCEPTION AND CAPABILITIES 
The findings of the previous chapters can be summarized as follows: 
With respect to the global trend, societies are aging worldwide, and the overall 
size of the world population is still growing.  The European countries, and here especially 
France, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, have either passed the climax point of this 
development or will pass it in the near future.  In other words, these societies are 
shrinking.  In contrast, their neighbors on the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea 
and in the Levant are rapidly growing. 
Consequently, the problems in the two groups of countries are different, and they 
have a different impact on security issues.  Whereas Europe will face an increasing 
financial burden in the social welfare budget, a shrinking workforce, and increasing 
immigration pressure from the Mahgreb countries, the Middle Eastern and North African 
regions will have to cope with restless young adults, rapidly progressing urbanization, 
declining natural renewable resources, and the latently present risk of ethnic-, religious-, 
or socio-economic-triggered riots that may turn into regional conflicts and terrorism. 
Although this threat, partly caused by demographic variables, was already present 
during the Cold War, at that time the European powers were primarily focused on the 
East-West conflict.  After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War in 1990, 
however, the problematic developments in the MENA countries began to emerge more 
and more and to influence European security policy. 
From a European perspective, the last 15 years can be divided into three periods.  
The first period, from 1990 to 1998, was influence by the believe in a peace dividend and 
thus a process of force reduction.  The second period, from 1998 until 2001, is 
characterized by the European Kosovo engagement and the resulting new security 
initiative.  The third period represents a watershed in respect to security and can be dated 
September 11, 2001.  This incident and the following war on Afghanistan and Iraq 
influenced the European security perspective dramatically, as was finally expressed in the 
European Security Strategy. 
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One common element of these three periods was the necessity to restructure and 
adapt the European military forces to the new security environment and to close the 
capability gap in comparison to the United States.  The demographic development in 
European countries, however, influences this reform and transformation process in two 
ways.  Due to a shrinking workforce, industrialized countries have to replace labor-
intensive military forces by forces on a high technological level, whereas at the same 
time, the demographic trend also leads to higher financial burdens in respect to social 
welfare expenditures.  Consequently, military budgets are under pressure. 
In subsequent sections, I outline and discuss the development of the new threat 
perception and the reaction of NATO and the European Union.  To complete this picture, 
the new requirements are then viewed within the context of the European demographic 
situation and budgetary constraints. 
 
A. NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION FROM 1990 TO 1998 
1. From Rome to Madrid 
The period between 1990 and 1998 is characterized by the end of the Cold War 
and the resulting new international security environment and the transformation process 
of NATO.  NATO’s new strategic concept, based on dialogue, cooperation, and the 
“maintenance of a collective defense capability,” was hammered out in a series of 
summits, beginning in November 1991 in Rome.157  The integral part of this new strategy 
focused on cooperation and partnership with Central and Eastern Europe.  NATO agreed 
to a 
reduced dependence on nuclear weapons and major changes in NATO’s 
integrated military forces, including substantial reductions in their size and 
readiness, improvements in their mobility, flexibility and adaptability of 
different contingencies and greater use of multinational formations.158 
To fulfill future requirements for crisis management and peacekeeping missions, 
NATO started to adapt its command structure.  A Declaration on Peace and Cooperation 
was issued to underline NATO’s will to support the transformation process in Central and 
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Eastern Europe.  The Brussels Summit in January 1994 finally created the Partnership for 
Peace Initiative, whose goal is to increase and stabilize security throughout Europe.159  
Finally, the Madrid Summit in 1997 proceeded with the process of the “open door 
policy,” and inviting the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to accession talks.  This 
summit also increased cooperation within the Partnership for Peace Program and started a 
new era concerning the relationship to Russia.  Progress in European Defense Initiative 
within NATO was achieved, and among others, the dialogue with the Mediterranean 
countries was intensified. 
That dialogue had been initiated at the Brussels Summit in 1994 as a result of the 
“Alliance’s cooperative approach to security.”160  Its goal is to contribute to the security 
and stability of the Mediterranean region, to foster a better mutual understanding, and to 
correct misperceptions about NATO among the Mediterranean countries.  The dialogue is 
based on a bilateral relation between NATO and participating countries on a case-by-case 
basis.161  In 1995, first Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia joined the 
dialogue, and then later Jordan and Algeria. 
 
2. From Maastricht to Amsterdam via Madrid 
Caused by the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact the immediate external threat of the 
Cold War disappeared.  The European Union, similar to NATO, began to concentrated on 
partnership programs to foster international security and stabilization, for example the 
European Mediterranean Partnership, the so-called Madrid Process.  A declaration was 
signed in 1995 by 15 EU member states and 12 non-member states, Mediterranean 
countries and the Middle East, some of whom were already members of the NATO 
Mediterranean Dialogue.162  The European declaration embraces three main goals, 
similar to those of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue.  They comprise issues including the 
creation of a common area of peace and security, economic and financial partnership, and 
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a social, cultural, and human partnership.  Furthermore, it was agreed to “establish a 
complete free trade area by the year 2010.”163 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, European heads of state and governments met 
in Maastricht in 1991 and agreed on the Treaty on the European Union, which replaced a 
system of several former treaties.  After its ratification the treaty came into force in 1993.  
In addition to the pillars of the European Community and of Justice and Home Affairs, a 
third pillar addresses Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes the 
development of a common defense policy that “shall include all questions related to the 
security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which 
might in time lead to a common defence.”164 
Specific types of military instruments and missions were not yet mentioned, and 
goals such as safeguarding common values, strengthening the security of the Union and 
its Member States, preserving peace and international security, promoting international 
cooperation, and developing and consolidating democracy, were still formulated 
generally.165 
To reach those goals, appropriate missions profiles were defined in 1992 at the 
WEU summit on the Petersberg near Bonn.  The so-called Petersberg Tasks, which 
embrace humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and combat forces tasks in 
crisis management, including peacemaking were included in 1997 in the revised Treaty 
of Amsterdam.166  Apart from those, defense issues were only touched by claiming that 
the policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice 
the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member 
States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which 
see   their   common   defence   realised   in   the   North   Atlantic   Treaty  
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Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible 
with the common security and defence policy established within that 
framework.167 
Although the Peterberg Tasks were agreed upon and finally included in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the military was not transformed into light, mobile and easily 
deployable forces to meet the requirements of these new tasks.  Instead they remained 
structured and equipped mostly according to a Cold War conception basis of reduced 
defense budgets and capabilities.168  
The weakness of this strategy was revealed in 1998 and 1999, when the Kosovo 
conflict reached its apex and European diplomatic and economic pressure was too weak 
to end the conflict.  Thus it was France and Great Britain who in 1998 proclaimed the 
Defense Initiative Declaration in St. Mâlo.  NATO, also, realized the large military-
capability gap that existed between the European allies’ forces and the U.S. forces and 
initiated itself a Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) in April 1999.  
 
B. NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION FROM 1998 TO 2001 
1. NATO’s Capability Gap – The Historical Dimension from 1950 to 
1970 
Although the Kosovo conflict can be seen as momentum for the initiation of 
NATO’s Defense Capability Initiative, designed to adapt NATO capabilities to the new 
security environment and to close the capability gap between the United States and the 
European allies, the question of NATO’s capabilities also had a historical dimension. 
Already from the early 1950s on, a gap between force “requirements and likely 
future capabilities” was present.  During that period of time the provision of conventional 
forces was influenced by a Western balance-of-power perception concerning the 
intentions of the Soviet Union.169  However, the contribution to NATO’s burden-sharing 
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by the different member countries was influenced by several factors.  For example, the 
U.S. engagement in the Korean War received the first priority on military resources.  
Both the United States and Great Britain reduced their contribution to NATO in favor of 
their own global interests and due to the necessity of maintaining forces worldwide.170  
France was engaged in Indochina at the time and therefore could not provide promised 
forces to NATO.171  After the withdrawal of its forces from that theater of war, France 
immediately engaged in North Africa.  Thus, Frances again had to use its military 
resources for non-NATO interests.172 
It was not only foreign engagements that contributed to NATO’s increasing 
capability gap, but also the inability of member states to raise their military expenditures 
without jeopardizing the European economy and living standards.  The main reasons for 
their reluctant behavior stemmed from the fact that the European economy had not yet 
recovered completely from World War II; some European governments were still 
unstable and the integration of West Germany into the West was not yet completed.173  
So, relying for example on the requirements of the Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) 
for 1954 in the Central Region, this reluctance in defense spending already led in 1954 to 
a capability gap of 1.3 divisions at D-Day, of 9.6 division at D+30 and of 2.6 Divisions at 
D+90.174 
Thus the 1954 review of NATO’s strategy and the final approval of MC 48 
(Massive Retaliation) was therefore not only a result of the availability of tactical nuclear 
weapons, but were also driven by the need to close the existing gap between force 
“requirements and the forces the allies were actually willing to and able to provide.”175  
This, however, does not mean that conventional resources became superfluous.  A U.S.-
NATO study came to the conclusion that, to get full advantage of the “large-scale tactical 
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use of nuclear weapons,” ground troops would be needed to “exploit the effects of the 
atomic counterattack before the enemy could recover.”176  Consequently, the introduction 
of MC 48 did not really ease the pressure on European military spending: instead, it was 
expected that new weapons should not replace, but supplement, the old existing 
systems.177 
Some years later, NATO’s strategy was revised again.  This time the change was 
initiated by Great Britain’s interest in reducing its own forces on the continent.  As a 
result, the MC 14/2 strategy was introduced in May 1957.  This strategy like the former 
relied on the deterrence of a use of nuclear weapons, but recognized the possibility of 
“limited forms of aggression with conventional forces too.”178  However, this strategy 
also failed to relieve budgetary pressure as the British had hoped.179  Instead, NATO 
called for a minimum requirement of thirty ready divisions in the Central Region but in 
1956 only a maximum of 28.3 divisions, including the 12 of Germany, could be 
expected.180 
Despite the “increased emphasis on conventional weapons” in the new NATO 
strategy, the defined requirements with respect to conventional capabilities could not be 
achieved completely.  One reason was the ongoing nuclearization of NATO which 
stressed the limited financial resources of NATO allies.  Similar to Great Britain and 
France, Germany tried to equip its forces with the “most modern weapons.”  From 1957 
to 1962, Germany’s procurement expenditures exceeded more than 50 percent for 
weapon systems such as aircrafts and missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons.181 
Even the MC 14/3 strategy (Flexible Response) that was approved by the North 
Atlantic Council in 1967 was unable to close the capability gap.  Although conventional 
forces became more important again under this strategy, NATO was not really able to 
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increase its conventional capabilities.  The German contribution due to the completion of 
its rearmament was almost nullified by the withdrawal of French troops from NATO in 
1966 and by the removal of U.S. and British units in 1968.182  This force reduction on the 
Continent was a consequence of the trilateral negotiations between the United States, 
Great Britain, and Germany, which were mainly about the German financial contribution 
to the “annual foreign exchange costs” to maintain British and U.S. forces in 
Germany.183  However, as a consequence of the outcome of those negotiations, other 
countries, like Belgium and even Germany, tried to obtain budgetary relief through “cuts 
of their own.”184 
In sum, it can be argued that during the twenty-year period from 1950 to 1970, the 
main reasons for the capability gap between NATO’s requirements and the actual 
availability of its forces were the differing viewpoints about the requirements of 
deterrence and the balance of conventional forces.  Whereas the United States 
emphasized the importance of appropriate responses to aggression and therefore focused 
more on the contribution of conventional forces, the European allies wanted to rely more 
on tactical nuclear weapons due to financial concerns.  Concerning the question of the 
balance-of-power, the Europeans argued that it was not possible to counterbalance the 
conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact.185 
As I outlined in broad terms above, the struggle within NATO about capabilities 
did not emerge in the late 1990s for the first time.  This problem had accompanied NATO 
from the very beginning.  Consequently, NATO’s attempt to close the capability gap by 
the introduction of the Defense Capability Initiative was just the continuation of an 
already existing pattern. 
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2. The Washington Summit and NATO’s Defense Capability Initiative 
During the war on Kosovo, the military capability gap between the United States 
and the European allies became more than obvious.  Especially noticeable was the lack of 
all-weather precision-bombing capabilities, allied intelligence collection, air- and ground-
surveillance communication technologies, airlift strategies, and stealth capabilities.  So at 
the NATO summit in Washington in April 1999, NATO’s 50th anniversary, they 
launched the Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) “to ensure that all Allies not only 
remain interoperable, but that they also improve and update their capabilities to face the 
new security challenges.”186 
The initiative covers “almost all areas of military capabilities.”187  Its main focus, 
however, is the improvement of capabilities concerning mobility and deployability, 
sustainability, effective engagement, survivability, and interoperable communications. 
In addition, NATO’s Defense Capability Initiative is designed to contribute to the 
strengthening of European defense capabilities, in order to foster the development of the 
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).  
 
3. From St. Mâlo to Nice 
In October 1997, with the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed by the European foreign 
ministers of the European Union’s 15 member states, Europe introduced a broader 
security agenda, which now is focused not only on the European or NATO territory, but 
also goes beyond those borders.  On November 23, 1998, one week before the Franco-
Anglican declaration of St. Mâlo, the former German minister of defense, Rudolf 
Scharping, stated in a speech, “Meeting the Challenges of the Future – Germany’s 
Contribution to Peace and Security in and for Europe,” given at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies: 
There is a band of instability running from the Balkans across the 
Mediterranean to North Africa and the Middle East. Security is indivisible. 
The spread of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism, 
international instabilities caused by a mixture of socio-economic and                                                  
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political imbalances and political fundamentalism could very well lead to 
a crisis requiring action on our part. These risks are unlikely to decline 
over the next few years.188 
Furthermore, also before the St. Mâlo Summit, the British government had 
published a White Paper on defense, in July 1998.  Here already at the national level, new 
emerging threats were pointed out, and the necessity of force transformation was 
emphasized. 
For the last two hundred years, the dominant force in international affairs 
has been the nation state. Most wars have been caused by attempts to 
create or expand such states. In contrast, over the next twenty years, the 
risks to international stability seem as likely to come from other factors: 
ethnic and religious conflict; population and environmental pressures; 
competition for scarce resources; drugs, terrorism and crime. 
These pressures operate both within states and across borders. The break-
up of states seems likely to be as much a security problem as traditional 
expansionism, although Saddam Hussein provides a powerful reminder 
that this should not be ruled out. Moreover, the consequences of initially 
local crises may spread dramatically in an ever more interdependent 
world.189 
In December 1998, still under the impression of the Balkan conflict, Great Britain 
and France brought the Treaty of Amsterdam, and with it, the common defense policy in 
the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), one step farther, by 
their Joint Declaration of St. Mâlo.  The declaration states, “the Union must have the 
capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to 
decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
crises.”190 
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By this document, Great Britain agreed to defense actions outside the NATO 
framework.  For France also it was a novelty, for France’s primary goal so far was to use 
its forces only on a “strictly national basis.”191  The Franco-Anglican approach was 
adopted by other European countries in 1999 at the European Council Summit in 
Cologne.  There the member states agreed that the EU should procure the capabilities 
necessary to conduct military crisis-management operations according to the Petersberg 
missions, either in the context of NATO or independent of the Alliance.  Furthermore, the 
“implementation of the necessary adaptations and notably the reinforcement of our 
capabilities in the field of intelligence, strategic transport, command and control” was 
stipulated.192 
Finally, in 2000, the European member states passed the Helsinki Headline Goal 
at the European Council Summit by which the member states committed firmly to 
voluntary cooperation in EU-led operations.  In addition, the member states committed 
themselves to implementing European Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF), to be used only to 
support the Petersberg missions.  Thus, the different member states had to be able, by 
2003, to deploy military forces of a scale up to 50,000 to 60,000 within sixty days for a 
period of at least one year. 
In the end, the European Union decided to establish the Political and Security 
Committee, the Military Committee of the European Union, and the Military Staff of the 
European Union as new parliamentary and military bodies, to fulfill the new 
responsibilities of the Nice European Council Summit in 2000.193 
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Although Europe was proceeding toward a common security and defense policy, 
this project became of much higher importance and momentum with the events of 
September 11, 2001. 
 
C. NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION FROM 2001 T0 2004 
1. NATO Prague Summit, November 2002 
Until 2001, the transformation process, especially the Defense Capability 
Initiative, was still driven by the impressions of the Kosovo conflict.  However, since 
September 11, it suddenly became obvious that it is not only NATO or the EU that 
decides where, when, and how to react to threats. The Western World in total is 
vulnerable to the new threat of terrorism.  So after the attacks against the United States, 
for the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5.  Triggered by these events, 
NATO’s foreign and defense ministers decided three months later that new ways have to 
be examined, to adapt NATO capabilities to react to this new threat.194 
At the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002, the member countries 
committed themselves to create a NATO Response Force (NRF), to streamline NATO’s 
military command arrangements, and to approve the Prague Capabilities Commitment 
(PCC).195 
Concerning the PCC, NATO member countries made firm political commitments 
to improve NATO’s capabilities in more than 400 areas, covering chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear defense; intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-
ground surveillance; command, control, and communications; combat effectiveness 
including precision-guided ammunition and suppression of enemy air defense; strategic 
air- and sea-lift, air-to-air refueling and deployable combat support and combat services 
support units as well.196 
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Furthermore, at this summit, NATO once again reaffirmed that “security in 
Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean.”197  It is explicitly 
emphasized that the Mediterranean Dialogue is an “integral part of the Alliance’s 
cooperative approach to security,” and “that the Mediterranean Dialogue and other 
international efforts, including the EU Barcelona process, are complementary and 
mutually reinforcing.”198 
 
2. From the Capabilities Commitments Conference to the European 
Security Strategy 
Parallel to NATO, the European countries forwarded their efforts in reinforcing 
military capabilities and identifying shortcomings within the Capability Commitments 
Conference (CCC).  At the Capability Improvement Conference (CIC) in 2001, the 
European member states identified additional shortcomings, including areas such as force 
protection and logistics and operational mobility, and “agreed upon a plan of action to 
remedy them.”199 
However, the most important step was the development of the European Security 
Strategy and its setting into force in December 2004.  In contrast to the treaties mentioned 
so far, the European Union member states addressed very clearly their threat perception, 
their strategic objectives, and their applied policies.  Thus, as main threats, the European 
Union identified terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, 
organized crime, and regional conflicts.  As a key strategic objective, the resolution of the 
Israel-Arab conflict was addressed and, in that context, the members decided that a 
broader engagement with the Arab world should be considered.  More generally, they 
addressed the Mediterranean area as a region that “undergoes serious problems of 
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economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts.”200  The strategy proclaims 
that this area “requires a continued engagement” through “more effective economic, 
security and cultural cooperation.”201 
However, in addition, the European Union also stated very clearly that, in order to 
deal with terrorism, failed states, or regional conflicts, political, economic, humanitarian, 
and juridical means may not be sufficient, and means like intelligence, police, or even 
military assets may be needed in order to resolve regional conflicts.202  Moreover, the 
European Security Strategy underlines the importance of the development of a strategic 
culture, to foster “early, rapid, and when necessary robust intervention.”203  In this 
context, the European security Strategy further proclaims that 
we need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when 
signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies 
arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the 
future.204 
 
D. A SUMMARY AND THE BUDGET QUESTION 
After having outlined the development of NATO’s and Europe’s security policy, 
their threat perception, and their initiated defense capability efforts over the last 15 years, 
one can realize that NATO and the European Union security interests were first focused 
on Central and Eastern Europe, to help and support the former states of the Warsaw Pact 
region.  Their attention then shifted more and more toward the Mediterranean region and 
the Middle East.  These regions were covered more intensively from the mid-1990s on by 
NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the European Madrid Process.  This period of time 
was characterized further by strong military budget cuts and force reductions, without, 
however, approaching the necessary transformation of the forces to meet the new tasks.  
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That reluctance became sharply evident during the Kosovo crisis in comparison to U.S. 
capabilities.  After 9/11, the Middle East and North Africa  became the main focus of 
NATO’s and the European Union’s security and stability interests.  However, similar to 
the Balkan conflict, the capability gap is still present, though Europe is working hard to 
catch up and meet the requirements defined in the DCI and the ESDI.  The German 
Ministry of Defense describes these goals in great detail in The Bundeswehr 2002: The 
Current Situation and Perspective stating that 
one trademark of the ESDP is the parallel and balanced build-up of civil 
and military forces and capabilities. […] It [ESDP] provides for the EU to 
raise a military rapid reaction force.205 
Furthermore, the German ministry of defense pointed out in the Defense Policy 
Guidelines of May 2003 that 
the Bundeswehr is being further developed with the intension of achieving 
a balance between its mission, tasks, equipment and resources.  In view of 
the changed security situation, the tasks of the Bundeswehr will be 
reprioritized.  Its capabilities will be adapted accordingly.  In future, 
financial resources will be used mainly for the provision of the military 
core capabilities.206  
Similar to Germany, Great Britain describes its obligations towards NATO as 
follows: 
In NATO our guiding objective is to play a leading role in modernization 
and adapting the Alliance, both militarily and politically, so that it can 
respond as effectively to new security challenges […].  In particular, we 
will promote improved capabilities, and a stronger European military 
contribution, particularly of deployable, mobile, sustainable forces now 
needed for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations.  Immediate 
priority areas are NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative and its Force 
Structure Review.207 
And in respect to the European Union, Great Britain’s Defense Policy 2001 
claims that 
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[the] central defense objective is to develop improved European military 
capabilities allowing the EU to undertake military crisis response 
operations in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy where 
NATO as a whole is not engaged.208 
France, too, stresses its obligation to contribute to the defense efforts of the 
international community, by laying down its Defense Overview.  This document states:   
[France] must also be able to act on a national, or possibly multinational, 
basis to defend national interests under threat, or to implement defense 
agreements signed with allies, in Africa or in the Middle East.  Thirdly, 
action within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance or of the 
Western European Union must be envisaged less in terms of a threat of the 
type posed for a long time by the USSR, than in terms of regional conflicts 
involving our obligations under the terms of treaties.  […] it is essential 
for our country to have the necessary military means to conduct strictly 
national actions to a certain level of intensity.  At the same time, it must 
have the necessary means to project expeditionary forces and to provide 
the corresponding theater joint-services command resources, which must 
be able to work with our allies.209 
Although these goals, as shown above by the example of select states, are 
acknowledged by all European Union members and formulated and transcribed in 
national defense documents, the question of how to maintain budgetary pressures caused 
by “demographic trends, in terms both of pressure on tax revenue and greater demands on 
health and social security spending” still exists.210  For example, a RAND study, 
published in 2001, tried to set up a framework to calculate a dimension of the 
“preliminary cost estimations,” as cost estimates for ESDP and the European Rapid 
Reaction Forces are not officially published so far by NATO and the EU.211 
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In addition to a top-down approach, based on estimated “annual military 
expenditure per U.S. soldier for new military investment and RDT&E,” and a bottom-up 
approach, by which cost estimations are based on the major system components that are 
“presumed to be necessary to achieve the targeted military capabilities,” the RAND 
authors used the structure of a U.S. Marine brigade and a U.S. Army assault division as 
possible “building blocs” and as models for cost estimations respectively.212  To simplify 
the model, the authors considered only costs representing military investment. 
The conclusion reached by the RAND study was that the estimated necessary 
capital costs for ESDP are between $24 billion and $56 billion (in real prices of 2000), 
depending on the model used.213 
In addition to the financial aspect of financing the military requirements of the 
new security environment, the British Defense Policy discusses the question with the 
realm of demography, so it notices that,  
more than ever, recruiting, retaining and motivating sufficient high-quality 
people will be critical. Demographic and social factors, particularly the 
aging of the British population, will make this more difficult. It will 
become increasingly important to maintain the widest possible recruiting 
pool as well as meeting the increasing expectations of civilian and Service 
personnel and their families. Pressure to reduce manpower requirements 
will intensify, and manpower requirements will become a far more 
significant factor in decisions on equipment procurement and force 
structures.214 
And it notes further that “the Armed Forces must ensure that they can attract 
recruits from all groups within the reducing recruitment pool.”215 
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In the following chapter, I discuss in more detail the military expenditures of 
France, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain, and their future prospects.  In doing so, I also 
consider the future demographic development and, consequently, the resulting 
prognostications of future social welfare costs and future economic development. 
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VII. THE EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES UNDER FINANCIAL AND 
SOCIO-POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS 
In the previous chapter, I described the shift in NATO’s and the European 
Union’s regional focus and threat perceptions.  Alerted by the Kosovo crisis in 1999, 
Europe realized that its forces were not prepared to meet the challenges of the new 
security environment.  Although since then Europe has made good progress in the 
political arena concerning security issues, the defined ambitious requirements needed to 
improve Europe’s military capabilities are difficult to realize in times of low economic 
growth and tense budgets. 
However, it is not only the transformation process that stresses Europe’s military 
budgets, but also the ongoing replacement of weapon systems introduced into the forces 
in the 1970s and 1980s that contributes to this problem.  For example, all major European 
countries introduced a modern generation of aircraft represented by the Eurofighter, 
Tiger, NH 90 and A-400M.  This has already generated a problem for the future.  In 25 to 
30 years, “when the peak of the aging problem occurs” and public budgets are assumed to 
be stressed by high social welfare expenditures, this generation of weapon systems will 
need to be replaced again.216  As replacement costs for combat aircraft in real terms are 
expected to double over a period of twelve to fifteen years, the price increase also has to 
be taken into account.217 
An additional aspect that may influence future military budgets, and thus has to be 
considered, is the impact of aging on the economy.  Taking the predicted demographic 
development of the European countries for granted, it is fair to assume that, due to an 
increase of elderly people by declining birth rates and increasing life expectancy, the old-
age dependency ratio will increase.  Consequently, this trend will lead to a reduction of 
the workforce.  But labor supply is not the only channel by which aging influences the 
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economy.  Demographers have yet to examine the extent to which public and private 
saving practices or the total factor productivity will be able to compensate for the 
influence of a shrinking workforce. 
This chapter outlines the areas of tension between military requirements and 
social necessities, and shows that, due to raising social expenditures, there is less leeway 
for a future increase of military expenditures.  It will discuss the budgetary situation 
concerning expenditures related to the social systems in France, Germany, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom.  But first, the influence of aging on the economy and the future 
economic growth potential has to be discussed.  Although, liabilities caused by National 
Debt are not age-related, they are considered in this discussion as well, because they will 
have a major impact on future public spending.  In the second section this chapter 
outlines the development of defense expenditures and their distribution by categories. 
 
A. DEMOGRAPHIC INFLUENCE ON THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
IN EUROPE AND ON THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 
1. The Impact of Aging on the Economy 
Guided by the UN long-term, medium-variant population projection, 
organizations like the IMF, OECD, and the EU assume a future decline of labor force in 
combination with an increase of the old-age dependency ratio, which, in sum, will have a 
considerable impact on future economic growth development.  Since the 1990s, all three 
institutions have begun to develop economic growth simulation models.  The IMF 
presented the first results in 1990, calculated by means of their simulation tool Multimod, 
followed by the OECD projection, based on the results of their Minilink model, in 1998.  
Finally in 1999, the directorate-general for economic and financial affairs of the 
European Commission (ECFIN) introduced their Quest II approach.218  To give a clear 
understanding of the underlying assumptions and initial values used for the ensuing 
projections, I first outline the basic assumptions and results of the Quest II approach. 
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a. Age-related Economic Transmission Mechanics 
From an economic point of view, aging is assumed to affect the economic 
growth potential by the following mechanics: 
expenditure pressures on the public finances; “life cycle” effects on 
private savings behaviors, as well as Ricardian equivalence effects 
operation through the deterioration in public savings; labor supply 
implications, potential impact on capital accumulation; effects on total 
factor productivity and finally the equilibrating role of interest rates and 
exchange rates and shifts of external balances.219 
Assuming a partial-equilibrium approach, these transmission mechanics 
and the way they are supposed to work, are briefly outlined in the following section. 
As already mentioned several times, public expenditures related to social 
welfare are expected to increase in the next decades due to an increasing old-age 
dependency ratio.  Whereas, for example, in France 2.6 workers in 2005 have to support 
one pensioner, in 2050, this will be done by only 1.4 workers.  Italy is the other end of 
the scale: there the old-age dependency ratio will increase from 0.45 to 1.0 during the 
same period of time.  Bearing this in mind, the projected increase of the social welfare-
related spending is even more likely, as since 1970, the increase of pension and health 
care expenditures “has accounted for nearly two-thirds of the increase in the total 
governmental expenditure to GDP ratio in the EU.”220 
A further economic aspect of aging is people’s saving behavior.  With 
respect to life-cycle models, savings are expected to be high if many people are 
employed.  It is assumed that those savings will then build up reserves for post-retirement 
consumption.  Consequently, it is also assumed that the saving rate will be low if a high 
portion of the population does not work, either because they are too young or because 
they already have passed the retirement age.  The problem with this model is that, on the 
one hand, as empirical evidence exists, scholars agree upon the link between aging and 
saving rates, but, on the other hand they disagree on how strong that correlation is.  As a 
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result of an aggregation of several studies from 1970 to 2000, the private saving rate is 
projected to decrease by 0.75 percent per 1 percent increase in the old-age dependency 
ratio.221 
The economists Kieran McMorrow and Werner Roeger include another 
factor as a possible transmission channel: the impact of capital accumulation.  They 
examine the influence of capital accumulation on future living standards, arguing that 
savings lead to productive investments and a “stronger long-run growth.”  McMorrow 
and Roeger come to the conclusion, however, that it is more likely, due to future 
demographic development that national savings will decline.  Consequently, national 
savings have to be increased to compensate for age-related effects.222  Furthermore, they 
point out that savings and investments not only influence the potential economic growth, 
but also have an impact on interest rates, exchange rates, and the balance of power.  This 
means in general terms that in the case of a worldwide imbalance of savings and 
investments, interest rates may come under pressure.223 
As a consequence of an increasing number of pensioners, the financial 
burden of social welfare costs will have to be distributed on fewer shoulders.  These 
costs, however, assuming a no-change policy, can only be covered by an increase of taxes 
or of benefit contributions.  Hence, the burden may lead to labor disincentives.224 
A further critical point in setting up economic simulation models is the 
assumption of the extent to which an increase of productivity may compensate for a 
decline in the workforce.  According to McMorrow and Roeger, no convincing empirical 
evidence has been found so far.  Thus they suggest “to take a neutral position with regard  
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to future technical progress.”  Consequently, they assume that the average rate of change 
of the technical progress in the last 10 years will remain the same in the next 50 years, 
too.225 
 
b. Key Variable of the Quest II Approach 
Although the different age-related economic parameters were discussed 
under the assumption of a partial equilibrium – that is, they were discussed isolated from 
one another and a mutual influence was consequently neglected – the Quest II simulation 
uses a general equilibrium approach.  By doing so, major obstacles can be overcome: 
using the general approach, policy adjustments can be included.  Furthermore, the related 
feedback of economies like, for example, changes in exchange rates, interest rates, saving 
behavior, or investments caused by political induced reforms can also be considered.  
Finally, global interdependencies have to be taken into account as well, as aging does not 
take place at the same rate and speed in all world regions.226 
Within this global approach, the European simulation model considers 
four variables, namely: household behavior, labor supply, production/technical progress, 
and government. 
For household behavior, the authors applied the equations of the Life 
Cycle Hypothesis.  The labor-supply side is modeled by using a modified wage equation, 
based on the standard neo-classical labor-supply model.  This equation not only includes 
the consumption of leisure time, but also elements borrowed from wage equations 
formulated in the “bargaining literature.”  Production and technical progress are modeled 
by using the CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) and Cobb Douglas production 
function, and firms are assumed to operate in a monopolistically competitive 
environment.227  Finally, the government expenditures are represented by using the 
following accounts: 
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interest payments on government debts, purchase of goods and services, 
government employment, net government transfer to households, net of 
unemployment benefits, and other transfers.228 
All government expenditures are assumed to be financed by labor income 
tax and social security contributions.  Further income sources are “corporate income 
taxes, energy taxes, value added tax and others receipts.”229  
 
c. Central Aging Scenario and Results 
The simulation of Quest II starts from a baseline scenario.  This condition 
of equilibrium is disturbed by two major age-related shocks.  The first one is a labor-
force shock that considers the future demographic development over a period of 50 years; 
the second shock refers to public expenditures, related to expenditure increases of 
pensions, health care, and education.  However, in order to avoid infinitely raising debts 
and interest payments, the requirements of the European Stability and Growth Pact are 
assumed as strictly redeemed.  Furthermore, all necessary “public expenditure increases” 
caused by age-related effects are assumed as “100% tax financed.”230  Finally, the 
simulation concerning the future European economic growth potential led to the results 
explained next: 
Regarding the living standard of the 15 EU countries, the Quest II 
projection predicts an average GDP per capita growth rate of -0.4 percent per annum. 
Cumulated over the period from 2000 to 2050, this annual decline reduces the GDP per 
capita level by 19 percent, compared to the baseline scenario.  After analyzing the 
decomposed result, one can see that the driving factors for the declining GDP per capita 
growth rate are the impact of aging on productivity and on the development of the 
dependency ratio. 
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With respect to the total GDP development itself, Quest II prognosticates 
an average fall of the annual GDP growth rate of 0.8 percent for the same period of time.  
Based on the data available in 2000 and the average GDP growth rate during the 1990s, 
this index is estimated to drop from 1.94 percent to 1.3 percent in absolute terms.231 
In the introduction to this chapter, two further simulation models were 
mentioned.  Those however, are not discussed in the same detail as is the case regarding 
the Quest II approach.  The underlying reason for this is the fact that the core of those 
models also is the Life Cycle Hypothesis, and therefore they deliver similar results.  
Consequently, in the following projection of future public spending in France, Germany, 
Italy, and the United Kingdom I use the data provided by Quest II as initial values. 
 
2. Future Economic Development of European Countries 
There is a declining population growth rate, caused by falling birth rates and an 
increase in life expectancy, in European countries.  By decomposing the UN long-term, 
medium-variant population projection, which is used throughout this thesis, with respect 
to the working age-related population cohort, one can observe that future generations will 
consist of a much smaller labor force.  In the period from 2005 to 2050, the French 
workforce is estimated to shrink by 10.1 percent, the German workforce by 20.9 percent 
and, in Italy and the United Kingdom, by 41.5 percent and 12.4 percent respectively.232 
As is shown by the Quest II approach, this situation is assumed to influence the 
potential future economic growth and lead to falling annual GDP growth rates.  However, 
as the complete data set for the French, German, Italian, and British economic 
development is not published in the cited research reports, I recalculated this 
development, using my own simplified assumptions and the annual average GDP growth 
rates of Quest II as initial values.  In the first step, IMF data are used to calculate the 
average economic growth rates of the four countries individually over a 15 year period 
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starting in 1990.  Finally, on this set of data, I apply the Quest II results.  This leads to the 




France Germany Italy Great 
Britain
2005 1.8 1.6 1.4 2.4
2050 1.1 1.3 1 1.7  

























































Figure 19.   EU 4 Real GDP Growth in 1995 Prices 
 
Although the GDP growth rates as shown in Table 5 are on a declining trajectory 
in all four countries, the different economies are slightly growing.  Among the four 
countries, Great Britain experiences the highest growth rates.  This trend however, may 
result from different reasons.  Although the British economy underwent several changes 
in its history, with the most relevant ones beginning in the years after World War II until 
the end of the Maggie Thatcher era in 1990, Great Britain represents one of the most 
liberal economies in Europe.  Furthermore, the public budget is less constrained by 
pension payments, because the British system provides only a government-financed 
minimum retirement income.  British citizens are expected to obtain the remainder of 
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their pension payments from other means, such as private occupational pensions.233  
Another reason may be that the general gross debt, expressed as a share of GDP (39.9 
percent in 2004), is by far the lowest among the countries compared in this case study.  
Finally, the future reduction of the British workforce is also one of the lowest.  Hence, 
the economic development outlined above provides a framework for the projection of 
future social-benefit expenditures and the financial leeway of other budgets. 
 
3. Future Development of Social Expenditures 
a. General Definitions 
In the previous section, I presented the general economic situation.  In this 
section, I lay out the future development of social expenditures.  However, some 
explanatory definitions have to be introduced first. 
In general, social expenditures are provided not only by the central 
government, but also by all public levels.  Consequently, expenditures made by “State, 
Regional and Local Government bodies” and “social security schemes” have to be 
considered.234 
In this case study, however, the expression social expenditure used is a 
slightly modified version.  In addition to public spending related to pensions, health care, 
and long-term care, it embraces unemployment benefits and expenditures for education.  
Long-term care however, is not discussed in this thesis in detail, as no figures for 
Germany are given and long-term care’s share of GDP in the other three countries is 
below 1 percent, even in the year 2050.235 
Finally, the term health expenditure used is the definition given by the 
OECD System of Health Accounts and is outlined in detail in Chapter II.236 
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b. The Development of Future Public Expenditures on Pensions 
The common problem of France, Germany, and Italy is that their pension 
systems are a taxed-based pay-as-you-go system.  This means that workers’ contributions 
are not saved for their future retirement payments, but instead are used to pay the present 
generation of pensioners.  The pensions of the present generation of workers have then to 
be paid, in turn, by the next generation.237  Consequently, the pension-related 
expenditures are directly linked to the impact of demographic development and, 
subsequently to economic development as well. 
In light of the future demographic projections, the Aging Working Group 
(AWG) of the European Union’s Economic Policy Committee examined closely the 
impact of aging on the pension system.  Although pension reforms initiated in Germany 
in 2001 and in France in 2003 are included in the AWG calculations, spending on public 
pensions as a share of GDP is still growing.  The only country that will experience a fall 
in public pension payments is Great Britain.  Another interesting point is that, although 
Italy is the country with the highest shrinkage of its workforce, its public-pension 
spending will increase by two percent over the next twenty-five years and will peak in 
2030. Thereafter, pension related-expenditures will fall again and level out only 0.3 
percent higher then the level in 2005.238 
 
Pension [%] 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 change [%]
FR 12.30 13.10 14.30 15.00 14.70 2.40
DE 10.80 11.10 12.10 13.80 14.40 14.90 4.10
IT 13.80 13.90 14.80 15.70 15.70 14.10 0.30
UK 5.30 5.10 4.90 5.20 5.00 4.40 -0.90  
Table 6. Projection for Spending on Public Pensions as a Share of GDP, 
Current Policy Scenario 
(After) Economic Policy Committee (2001) and Economic Policy Committee (2003) 
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Although, the total increase of public-pension expenditures appears 
relatively moderate over the next 45 years, the situation looks totally different in absolute 
terms.  Based on the GDP development laid out above, the absolute increase in real terms 
ranges from approximately 172 percent up to almost 250 percent compared to the 
payments of 2005. 
 
Pension [€] 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 change [%]
FR 181.88 211.34 271.84 331.81 374.02 205.64
DE 222.71 247.34 312.02 407.22 481.26 558.63 250.83
IT 148.20 159.76 193.31 230.77 257.35 255.59 172.46
UK 82.12 88.73 106.04 137.66 159.45 166.69 202.98  
Table 7. Projection for Spending on Public Pensions in Constant Prices of 1995, 
Current Policy Scenario 
(After) Economic Policy Committee (2001) and Economic Policy Committee (2003) 
 
c. The Development of Future Public Expenditures on Health Care 
In regard to the development of future health-care expenditures, the 
overall situation looks similar to that of future pension payments.  Depending on the 
country, the AWG estimates an increase of public spending on health care between 1.4 
percent and 2.1 percent over the period from 2000 to 2050.  So in 2050, total health-care 
expenditures cumulate between 6.0 percent and 8.1 percent of the GDP.  The data for the 
years 2005 et sequentes, as illustrated in Table 8, are calculated on values published by 
the Economic Policy Committee. 
 
Health-care 
[%] 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 change [%]
FR 6.37 6.54 6.40 7.28 7.68 8.10 1.73
DE 5.88 6.07 6.46 6.88 7.33 7.80 1.92
IT 5.05 5.20 5.52 5.86 6.22 6.60 1.55
UK 4.72 4.85 5.12 5.40 5.69 6.00 1.28  
Table 8. Projection for Spending on Health Care as a Share of GDP, 
Current Policy Scenario 
(After) Economic Policy Committee (2001) and Economic Policy Committee (2003) 
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Although the overall increase of health-care expenditures seems to be 
relatively moderate, a picture similar to that of public-pension spending is obtained.  The 
overall increase of health-care payments, expressed in constant prices of 1995, doubles or 
triples with respect to a 2005 baseline. 
 
Health-care 
[€] 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 change [%]
FR 94.16 105.51 131.16 161.01 195.36 234.52 249.07
DE 121.29 135.24 166.63 203.03 244.83 292.44 241.11
IT 54.21 59.78 72.10 86.12 101.93 119.64 220.70
UK 73.20 84.40 110.71 142.83 181.44 227.23 310.42  
Table 9. Projection for Spending on Health Care in Constant Prices of 1995, 
Current Policy Scenario 
(After) Economic Policy Committee (2001) and Economic Policy Committee (2003) 
 
d. The Development of Future Public Expenditures on Education 
and on Unemployment Benefits 
As a further age-related subject, the expenditure on education is 
considered here too.  According to the UN World Population Prospect database, the 
projected number of young people, aged between 3 and 24 years, will decrease 
dramatically by 2050.  Therefore, expenditures on education also are related to 
demographic development, and consequently, influence public spending.  With the 
exception of Germany, whose expenditures on education will increase slightly, by 0.1 
percent by 2050, even though the appropriate population cohort, aged between 3 and 24, 
will decrease by 11.7 percent, the other three countries will experience a decrease in 
education-related spending.  So public spending on education, expressed as share of 
GDP, is projected to fall by 0.9 percent in France, whereas the one of Italy and Great 
Britain is expected to fall by 0.6 percent and 0.8 percent respectively.239 
Although unemployment benefits are not an age-related subject, those 
expenditures, consume a high percentage of the produced GDP.  On the other hand one 
can argue that, due to a decreasing workforce, those expenditures have to decrease too, as 
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more unemployed people can be brought back to work.  Relying on this assumption, the 
Economic Policy Committee expects for Germany a declining unemployment rate from 
7.9 percent in 2000 to 5.6 percent in 2050.  Consequently the share of GDP on 
unemployment spending will decrease from 1.1 percent in 2000 to 0.7 percent in 2050.  
Similar results are obtained for France and Italy.  In contrast to those countries, however, 
British unemployment expenditures will slightly increase from 0.3 percent to 0.4 percent 
of GDP.240 
 
e. The Overall Impact of Aging on Public Expenditures 
In the previous section, the different age-related components of public 
spending were introduced and briefly discussed. In sum, the projection related to pension, 
health care, long-term care, education, and unemployment benefits amounts to a share of 
GDP between 18 percent and 30.2 percent.  A complete overview for all four countries is 





2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Change [%]
FR 26.3 26.9 29.3 30.6 30.6 30.5 4.2
DE 23.7 23.4 24.9 28.4 29.9 30.3 6.6
IT 24.4 24.5 25.5 26.6 27.1 25.8 1.4
UK 17.5 17.3 17 18 17.3 18 0.5  
Table 10. Projection of Public Spending on Pensions, Health, Long-Term Care, 
Education, and Unemployment Benefits as Share of GDP 
(After) Economic Policy Committee (2003) 
 
To complete this picture, debt liabilities should also be mentioned in this 
context.  Although appropriate interest payments are not age-related, they will 
nevertheless have a high impact on the future financial situation.  For example, the 
OECD specifies the net debt interest payments for 2005 at 2.5 percent of GDP for 
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Germany, at 2.8 percent for France, at 4.7 percent and 1.5 percent respectively for Italy 
and Great Britain.  Adding these liabilities to the social expenditures, public spending in 
2005 for all these subjects together will lie in a bandwidth between 19 percent in the 
British case and approximately 29 percent for France and Italy.  Germany will then have 
to spend 26.2 percent of its GDP.241 
However, converting the shares of total GDP into shares of general 
government total outlays, it becomes obvious that only the expenditures of the six 
subjects introduced so far already block between 42 percent and 60 percent of the present 
general governmental layout.242 
To include the different interest payments, the individual average 
liabilities for France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy are first calculated by means of 
an OECD data set reflecting the period between 2000 and 2006.  These average values 
are then used to extrapolate into the future.  This approach is chosen because, since 2000, 
the Italian payments have been relatively constant with a declining trend and, for the 
other three countries, the deviation from the long-term average is minimal.  An 
extrapolation and illustration of this budgetary situation is now given in the figures 
below. 
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Figure 20.   Projection of Public Expenditures for Germany 
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Figure 22.   Projection of Public Expenditures for Italy 
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Figure 23.   Projection of Public Expenditures for Great Britain 
 
Comparing all of these graphs, the interesting point is that Italy, the 
country with the highest old-age dependency ratio in 2050 and the highest workforce 
shrinkage, will be better off in 2050 than Germany and France.  In Italy, the financial 
situation will be worst between 2035 and 2040 and will recover by 2050.  However, the 
total amount of the payments related to social expenditures, including debt payment 
amounts will still approximate 60 percent of the general governmental outlay.  In sum, 
and with the consideration that public expenditures related to the above mentioned 
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subjects are already high in Italy, the fiscal situation will stay relatively stable and the 
impact of aging on the economy will be rather moderate. 
The situation looks similar in Great Britain.  Here, the impact of aging is 
almost unnoticeable.  The public burden on social spending, including liabilities, stays 
constant on a level of approximately 45 percent. 
In contrast to those two countries, the situation in Germany and France 
look different.  Here the impact of aging is most dramatic.  In France, the above listed 
expenditures will increase from 54 percent to 62 percent in the period between 2005 and 
2040.  In Germany, the social burden, including debt liabilities, will increase from 56 
percent to 68 percent of the total general government outlay.  Consequently, the increase 
of age-related necessities of 8 percent and 16 percent, respectively, will have to be saved 
in other areas.  Taking into account the fact that, in the past, European countries were 
rather inclined to cut military expenditures in times of weak economies and tight budget 
situations, it is fair to argue in this context that an increase of military expenditures will 
be rather unlikely.  On the contrary, it is more likely that the military budgets will have to 
contribute to future savings. 
 
B. THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE EFFORTS UNDER FINANCIAL AND 
SOCIO-POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS 
The previous section, emphasized the overall future financial situation of four 
selected European states.  It showed that the scope of action for some expenditures, 
especially military budgets, will become tighter due to demographic developments.  The 
situation is further displaced by the reluctance of European states to increase military 
spending, which makes it even more difficult for them to meet the requirements 
formulated in NATO’s DCI and the European Union’s Capability Action Plan.  On the 
other hand, Europe must not only transform its armed forces to adapt to the new security 
environment, but also replace aging equipment. 
Because France, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain are the biggest nations in 
Europe, with the highest military expenditures, I limit the following assessment largely to 
those countries.  However, to some extent, I also consider U.S. expenditures, but only to 
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emphasize major differences.  I also treat in more detail data pertaining to the total 
defense expenditures, defense expenditures as percent of GDP and per capita, and their 
distribution by different categories.  This leads to a discussion, of the different 
possibilities that European countries have to ease the financial tensions and to improve 
their capabilities in the future. 
 
1. Definitions 
Military-related data are provided by many sources such as, among others, by 
NATO, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (IISS).  In this assessment, I have drawn mainly on NATO and SIPRI.  This is 
done because comparing sets of data taken from different sources may create obstacles.   
NATO, for example, raises its data by using standardized questionnaires, whereas other 
institutions’ data represent a summary of different sources, including NATO.  SIPRI 
points out that its data are “based on open sources only, including a SIPRI 
questionnaire.”243  A similar statement is given by IISS, which claims, however, that its 
assessments are based on a variety of sources.244 
Another major problem is the definition of defense expressions.  NATO, for 
example, when compiling data from its questionnaire, about paramilitary troops, such as 
border police forces, includes in military budgets the French gendarmerie and the Italian 
carabinieri.  In Germany, the border police are under the control of the Ministry of 
Interior, but according to NATO, that data also is added to the defense expenditures.  
Furthermore, in Germany, retirement pensions for military personnel are not an integral 
part of the defense expenditures.  But again, according to NATO’s data compilation, they 
also are shifted to the defense budget.  The result is that defense expenditures listed by 
NATO may be higher than the official ones published by the pertinent government, as for 
example, in the case for Germany. 
                                                 
243 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Databases,” SIPRI data on military 
expenditure, http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html, (accessed 07 February 2005). 
244 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Military Balance 2004-2005,” Preface and 
Explanatory Notes: 6, http://www.iiss.org/conferencepage.php?confID=61. 
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With respect to financial issues, we must pay attention to which GDP the data are 
applied to, the nominal or the real GDP.  In the latter case, implications caused by 
inflation are excluded.  For a clearer overall comparison, I express the defense 
expenditures in U.S. dollars.  The most reliable data expresses expenditures in percent of 
GDP in constant prices and exchange rates related to a certain base year (e.g., 1995 or 
2000).  Otherwise, the data is distorted and may indicate increasing expenditures, 
whereas, in reality, the value is decreasing. 
In the ensuing discussion, I apply the NATO approach as it provides the best 
comparability among countries. 
 
2. The Development of European Defense Expenditures – A Case Study 
Shortly after the Berlin Wall came down (1989-1990), NATO, and the European 
countries especially, started to reduce their defense expenditures and troop strengths.  As 
compared to France, Great Britain, and Italy, Germany had to cope with the highest 
reduction of its defense budget because of costs of unification.  Whereas Italy’s 
expenditures started to increase slightly from 1995 on, and were higher in 2003 than in 
1990, Germany reduced its expenditures by 32.4 percent over a period of 13 years, which 
is equivalent to an average cut of expenditures of 2.96 percent per annum.  Although, the 
German minister of finance and minister of defense agreed to keep the military 
expenditure stable, the latter was cut by € 0.5 billion in nominal terms for fiscal year 
2005. 
In contrast to Germany, France only reduced its defense expenditures by 
approximately 8 percent from 1990 to 1995 and has stabilized its spending since then.  
The situation in Great Britain is similar to that in France.  Their budget was reduced by 
almost 25 percent over a period of six years, but British expenditures have been slightly 
increasing again since 2000. 
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Defense Expenditures














































































Figure 25.   Defense Expenditure USA versus EU 4 
 
This trend can probably be explained by the impact of the St. Mâlo Summit in 
1998 and countries’ resulting commitment to increase their defense efforts. 
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If we compare the development of European military budgets with that of the 
United States, it becomes obvious how big the difference in military spending between 
those two regions is. 
Although the United States redeemed its “peace dividend” and cut its military 
budget by almost 25 percent between 1990 and 1996, followed by a slight increase until 
2000, it is still 2.5 times higher than those of Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain 
together.  However, the impact of 9/11 is also clearly visible.  Since 2002, the U.S. 
military expenditures are again increasing and are now on a higher level than in 1990, 
whereas European spending leveled out at about US $120 billion. 
The trend described in the preceding paragraphs continues taking into account the 
economic situation and the share of military expenditures with respect to GDP. 
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Figure 26.   Annual Change of Defense Expenditures Based on Real Terms 
 
Although the average annual real GDP growth in the 1990s balanced at 
approximately 2 percent after a sharp decline at the beginning of that decade, the annual 
rate of change of military expenditures equals to -5 percent from 1990 to 1995.  From 
then on, the rate of change stabilized at approximately zero percent; that is, the defense 
budgets in real terms remained steady at their 1995 levels.  In other words, whereas the 
economy was increasing annually by 2 percent in real terms during the 1990s, the level of 
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military budgets remained almost unchanged.  Even more, its value and share of GDP 
decreased by at least the same amount as the economy grew.  The appropriate changes in 
share of GDP are illustrated in Table 11. 
 
Share of GDP 1990 2000 Change [%]
France 3.50 2.60 -25.7
Germany 2.80 1.50 -46.4
Italy 2.10 2.10 0.0
United Kingdom 4.10 2.60 -36.6  
Table 11. Defense Expenditures as Share of GDP 
(After) SIPRI 
 
Defense Expenditures per Capita





































Figure 27.   Defense Expenditures per Capita 
 
Compared to U.S. spending, the ones of the EU 4 seem to be only a small 
contribution.  Total expenditures of the selected European countries represent 
approximately only 40 percent of the U.S. spending.  However, considering  expenditures 
per capita changes this picture a little bit in favor of Europe.  In total, U.S. spending per 
capita is still higher than that of the European countries, but the ratio changes: the defense 
expenditures per capita of France are still 80 percent compared to that of the United 
States; and even Great Britain’s and Germany’s spending per capita are, after all, 50 
percent of that of the United States. 
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If all things remain equal, the situation may improve in the future in favor of these 
four European countries.  The defense expenditures per capita will increase, as the 
populations start to decline in the next years (except for that of France), whereas the U.S. 
population is slowly growing.  The index defense expenditures per capita is to some 
extent, however, just a cosmetic feature.  Demographic effects can be considered and 
used to express the burden-sharing per capita.  However, in reality, weapon systems and 
personnel have to be financed and paid in real terms, that is, in absolute money.  A better 
ratio would be defense expenditures per soldier/personnel or even research and 
development expenditures per soldier/personnel.  Whereas the former ratio represents a 
measure of the mechanization of the forces, the latter ratio may be more suitable to 
describe the state-of-the-art complexity and modernity of today’s armed forces. 
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Figure 28.   Defense Expenditures per Soldier 
 
If we compare the ratio defense expenditure per soldier between the different 
countries, we be realize that Great Britain again is in a class of its own.  British spending 
per soldier is as much as the spending of Germany and France combined.  However, one 
feature is common to all countries.  In the first half of the transformation phase, defense 
expenditures  were  cut  by  the  same  rate as personnel.  This means that no extra money  
108 
was available that could be shifted to investments.  It was not until the mid-1990s that the 
situation slowly changed and the reductions of expenditures became less in comparison to 
that of personnel. 
That situation is reflected also in expenditures related to research and 
development.  Not only did the spending of France and Great Britain exceed those of 
Germany and Italy by more than 100 percent, there was also a clear increase in favor of 
research and development.  Italy’s expenditures on research and development, however, 



































Figure 29.   Research and Development Expenditures 
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This trend is also noticeable in the ratio of research and development per soldier. 
 
Research & Development Expenditures per 
Soldier





















Figure 30.   Research and Development Expenditures per Soldier 
 
Taking into account other categories of military expenditures, one has to admit 
that Great Britain was best able to master the transformation process.  In comparison to 
the other three countries Great Britain has the highest budget available, but the least 
personnel.  Therefore, its personnel costs represent approximately only 40 percent of the 
total spending.  In contrast to those figures, Germany’s and France’s personnel 
expenditures level at 60 percent on average, whereas Italy spends almost 75 percent for 
its personnel.  Another interesting point is that Germany’s expenditures for infrastructure 
decreased only slightly, even many units had been closed since 1990.  Here the British 
forces have an advantage.  Because they concentrated their remaining forces in fewer 
barracks, they have been able to cut spending for infrastructure since 1990 by 
approximately 4 percent.  As the fraction of others increased, it can be assumed that the 
money saved is partly invested in research and development, as an increase of 2 percent 
can be noted there. 
The same observations can be made regarding the category equipment. Germany 
has the third lowest budget of the four countries, but a force size as high as that of France 
(in 2003).  In contrast, Great Britain’s strength of armed forces is clearly the lowest of the 
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four, with the lowest personnel costs.  So, in Great Britain’s case, spending for equipment 
is still at a level of 23 percent of total expenditures, whereas Germany spends only 14 
percent on equipment. 
 











































Figure 31.   German Defense Expenditure - Distribution by Category 
 





























































































Figure 33.   British Defense Expenditure - Distribution by Category 
 











































Figure 34.   French Defense Expenditure - Distribution by Category 
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3. Assessments and Perceptions 
Confronted with the situation described in the previous section, EU Secretary 
General Javier Solana admitted in an article he wrote in Jane’s Defense Weekly in June 
2000, that 
too often the lack of progress has been the result, not of too much 
America, but of too little Europe. […] The aim is to give the EU all 
instruments it needs, backing its diplomatic, economic and trade tools, if 
and when necessary, with the ability to use military assets. […] We know 
we are short of strategic transport, intelligence and command-and-control 
assets. These can only be delivered by short- to medium-term increases in 
defense budgets and, in some cases, a significant re-orientation of our 
defense efforts.245 
The former German Minister of Defense, Rudolf Scharping, argues the same way. 
With respect to an appropriate increase of the defense budget, Scharping emphasized, 
if this does not happen the Bundeswehr will not fit into NATO’s military 
framework and will be unable to fulfill the demands of European co-
operation.246 
But the main focus in Germany in 2000 was the reduction of the public debt.  
Thus no leeway for additional money to finance the DCI requirements was allowed.  The 
German Undersecretary of State for the Ministry of Defense, Walter Kolbow, 
consequently pointed out at a conference “attended by industrial representatives” on May 
4, 2000 that 
the gaps in the capabilities of Germany’s international obligations shall be 
closed while retaining compulsory service and within the framework of 
financial restrictions.247 
This means nothing other than that the transformation process has not to take 
place with additional financial means, but by internal optimization.  However, this 
position was criticized by the U.S. defense expert Daniel Gouré.  His argument is that the 
“expense-dynamic for new weapons procurement in Germany are similar to those in the 
                                                 
245 Javier Solana, "Europe Must Build Its Military Muscle," Jane’s Defense Weekly (14 June 2000), 
http://jdw.janes.com/ (accessed 22 March 2005). 
246 Ruediger Moniac, "Germany: DCI suffers lack of funding," Jane’s Defense Weekly (14 June 
2000), http://jdw.janes.com/ (accessed 22 March 2005). 
247 Ibid. 
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United States.”248  He continues by saying that therefore the procurement costs must be 
expected to rise on average by 5.1 percent per annum and that, consequently, the 
procurement budget has to double every 14 years “to provide for steady and continued 
modernization and replacement of the forces.”  Daniel Gouré concludes that even an 
increase of the procurement budget by 0.1 percent of GDP would not be sufficient to 
meet these goals.249 
The Italian Defense Minister Antonio Martino, supported the position of Daniel 
Gouré, also arguing in 2002, that Europe should aim at a convergence of its defense 
expenditures in terms of percent of GDP, without, however, violating the Maastricht 
criteria.  Furthermore, he suggested that “Europe should allow 0.2-0.4 percent of the 
GDP to be devoted to long-term investment without being included in the total public 
spending.”250 
Another argument often brought up in the context of military budgets is 
conscription.  In order to professionalize its forces, France suspended conscription in 
June 2001 and then abolished it on 31 December 2002.  However, looking at the 
development of the military budget, one discovers that, although since 2002 France has 
reduced the overall strength of personnel of its forces by ten thousand, its military budget 
increased by approximately US $1.3 billion, measured in constant prices and exchange 
rates of 2000. 
The Italian Defense Minister Antonio Martino takes a completely different 
position.  In an interview with Jane’s Defense Weekly in June 2002, he said that Italy’s 
parliament had decided to suspend conscription in 2007.  According to Martino, one of 
the  major  issues  in  this  decision  was  the  demographic  development  of  the  Italian  
population.  He argues that, due to the stagnation of the “Italian birth rates over the past 
                                                 
248 Daniel Gouré, “International Security and the Aging Crisis,” CSIS International Security Program 
(December 2000): 24, http://www.csis.org/gai/intlsecaging.pdf (accessed 6 November 2004). 
249 Ibid., 24-25. 
250 Paolo Valpolini, “Interview with Antonio Martino, Italian Defense Minister,” Jane’s Defense 
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15 years,” it was difficult to meet the required conscript level.251  Hence, he continues, 
my decision is based not only on ideology – I don’t believe in conscription 
– but also on pragmatism, and this makes me believe we must shift to a 
new model as soon as possible.252 
Although in Germany also the number of young adults eligible for conscription 
will decrease due to the influence of demographic development in the future, its rational 
is less about the financial aspect of conscription than about justice and conscription’s 
contribution to society.  Considering conscription in the context of the demographic 
development in Germany, the former chief of staff, retired General Klaus Naumann, 
argued a position quite opposite to that of the Italian minister of defense.  According to 
Klaus Naumann, the German armed forces are at risk because of Germany’s shrinking 
population.253  Furthermore he points out that 
conscription is still necessary for Germany primarily due to the 
demographic development in the country.  The number of young, fit, 
qualified people will continue to diminish over the years to come.  Armed 
forces traditionally don’t get too much access to this group of people 
unless they pay a lot of money.  As a drastic increase in the budget of 
defense is not very likely due to the need to reform domestically and 
socially I think we have to look for options of how to attract qualified 
young people and one of the proven instruments for recruitment is 
conscription.254 
The conscription problems discussed above have also been addressed by the 
British Secretary of State for Defense, Geoff Hoon.  For example, the 2001 British 
Defense Policy emphasizes that “a number of factors are likely to combine to maintain 
budgetary pressures.”  They include the, “defense cost pressure” and “demographic 
trends in terms both of pressure on tax revenue and greater demands on health and social 
security spending.”255  Furthermore, Geoff Hoon pointed out that in the long run British 
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force recruitment will be challenged by future demographic developments and the need 
for highly qualified, motivated, and skilled personnel.256 
In comparison to the other three European countries, the United Kingdom is best 
off in regard to its budget.  But the interesting point is that Great Britain most clearly 
addresses its future demographic challenges and their implications for security, defense 
policy, and military budgets. 
So, in sum, it can be argued that, between all major European countries, 
consensus exists to the effect that no leeway will exist for future increases of their 
military budgets, due to the financial problems caused the demographic development.  
But now the question is, what options are available to meet the transformation goals to 
which those governments committed themselves? 
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VIII. EUROPEAN POLITICAL - MILITARY POLICY OPTIONS 
A. CURRENT REFORM AND TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES 
The social-political constraints under which the European forces presently have, 
and will have, to operate were outlined in the previous chapter.  As I showed there, the 
chance for increasing future defense budgets is rather small.  Similar to Germany, France 
broke the Stability and Growth Pact in 2004 for the third time in a row.  Consequently, 
Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin ordered all ministries to freeze or reduce 
spending.257  It is expected, therefore, that the French will cut defense expenditures as 
share of GDP from a level of 2.04 percent in 2004 to 1.99 percent in 2005.  This trend 
will continue until 2008, with an estimated share of 1.87 percent of the GDP. 
But this does not mean that the reform process in Europe has come to a halt.  On 
the contrary, Europe has been politically and militarily very successful in continuing its 
reform and transformation process in order to adapt its forces to the new threat 
environment.  For example, the French government set up a challenging six-year plan 
which includes for 2005 the procurement, among others, of ten Rafale multi-role fighter 
aircraft, eight HAP Tiger helicopters, one NH multi-role medium helicopter, 330 VAB, 
and 66 VBL armored personnel carriers.258 
Not only France, but also Germany, forwarded the transformation process of the 
Bundeswehr, too.  So, although Germany is working on all areas identified by NATO’s 
Defense Capability Initiative, German priorities are strategic deployability, global 
intelligence, and C3 capabilities.  Within those main areas, the German government 
contracted, between 1998 and 2001, approximately 12 billion Euros, part of which was 
used for projects like MIDS (multifunctional information distribution system); SAR 
LUPE, an all-weather radar satellite system for strategic reconnaissance; UH-TIGER 
helicopters; and the conversion of four A-310 Airbus to multi-role transport tanker 
aircrafts.  In addition to those investments,  the Bundestag backed the procurement of 73 
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A-400M transport aircrafts in 2002 to replace the aging C-160 Transall fleet.259  Since 
2000 further efficiency improvements have been achieved in German forces by 
introducing the Development, Procurement, and Management Group (GEBB).  The 
GEBB is organized as a private company and “has a central role to play in the 
coordination and co-operation with industry and trade and the creation of additional 
leeway for investments.”260 
Its main management systems are the Fleet Management System, responsible for 
the provision and optimization of the transport services; the Clothing Management 
System, responsible for the “reduction of stocks and storage capacities” and the 
economical provision of personal equipment; and finally the Real Property Management 
System, which is, among others, responsible for the management and marketing of no 
longer needed infrastructure.261 
Another company founded in 2002 was the Information Technology Company.  
Its task is to provide information technology, ranging from “standard office equipment 
and large-scale databases used for steering the flow of material and the IT elements of 
weapon systems to the command, control and information systems used by the different 
services.”262 
In addition to these measures, Germany could effect further improvement in 
budgetary control by introducing new controlling means, like a cost and performance 
responsibility program and a continuous improvement program.  The former program 
should encourage personnel to “embody economic efficiency as a principle criterion 
governing the way they think and act.”263  The latter program should encourage 
personnel to develop creativity and propose areas and ways to save money. 
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Beside these aspects, the German Armed Forces has continued with its internal 
reform process by optimizing and combining common tasks, command support, 
intelligence support, and general training assets.  The aim was to reduce the burden on 
the Army, Air Force, and Navy so that they would be more capable of concentrating on 
their core operational tasks.  With respect to operation planning and conducting, the 
Bundeswehr Operations Command (BwOPSCOM) was introduced; it serves at the same 
time as national element and infrastructure “for an EU Operations Headquarters under 
German command.”264 
The next decisive step within the transformation of the German Armed Forces is 
the adaptation to a new operational spectrum.  From 2004 to 2010, the forces will be 
restructured in three new force categories – response forces, stabilization forces, and 
support forces – and will consist in total of a strength of 152,500 military personnel.265  
The overall capability of these force categories will be fully drawn from the “joint action 
of the Army, Air Force, Navy, Joint Support Service and Central Medical Service.”266 
But in an international context, these resources will not only contribute to NATO 
but also to the European “Battle Groups” that were agreed upon by the European 
ministers of defense in November 2004.  So Germany will contribute in total to four 
battle groups, each of which has a strength of 1,500 soldiers.267 
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The broadening of the task spectrum in the German armed forces, however, 
consequently led to a demand for “highly qualified, flexible and motivated personnel.”268  
In response to that demand, the Bundeswehr introduced a new personnel structure and an 
attractiveness program. 
Similar to Germany, the “Policy for People” is clearly expressed in the British 
Defense Policy of 2001.  However, in the British paper this problem is discussed not only 
from the military point of view, but also in demographic terms too.  Aware of the 
predicted future demographic development in Great Britain, the ministry of defense sees 
itself in competition with industry to get the “best and brightest” and to recruit enough 
young people to fill available posts. 
The above outlined reform and transformation process of the British, French, and 
German military points out that, while no extra money is presently available for the task, 
European military forces were able, by internal optimization, to begin the adaptation to 
the new mission spectrum.  However, this process takes a very long time, and in the 
German case, its completion is projected for 2010.  The process of internal optimization 
will come to an end sooner or later, but the budgetary constraints caused by the 
demographic developments will further increase.  So to catch up and close the 
capabilities gap, with respect to the new mission scenarios according to the ESDP, the 
European nations have to think about how to get the most “bang for the buck.” 
Europe’s policy of economics is oriented toward fulfilling the most important 
criteria of the stability and growth pact: low inflation rates and low new borrowing per 
annum.  An increase in military expenditures financed by an increase of deficits is neither 
reasonable nor popular and, consequently, cannot be pushed through politically.  Hence, 
this leads to the question, what possible future policy options may be available to 
strengthen capabilities to react to the new threat scenarios and to proceed with military 
transformation under the circumstances of tight budgets? 
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B. POSSIBLE FUTURE POLICY OPTIONS 
As outlined in the previous section the presently ongoing reform and 
transformation process is mainly driven by internal optimization with the goal to 
streamline processes and to reduce redundancies and slack, in order to free money that 
can then be invested in modernization.  The U.S. defense expert Daniel Gouré compares 
this situation to the funding of military forces with an “insurance that may never be 
used.”  Therefore, military spending is a “tradeoff between costs and risks.”269  The 
question is, what policy options are available? 
With respect to Daniel Gouré’s assessment, the policy option, hoping for the best, 
is perhaps the “most likely scenario” as long as the threats and conflicts “remain remote 
and small” and as long as the threat scenarios do not “threaten the allies’ economic and 
security interests.”270  He argues, on the one hand, that the threats due to “regional 
instability” and the “economic order” are recognized, but that, on the other hand, the 
unwillingness to increase military expenditures in order to be able to meet those threats, 
if forced to, is still high.271  However, a counterargument to Daniel Gouré’s is that, at 
least in the European case, it is not a question of willingness in the first place, but a 
question of historical experience and budgetary constraints.  Furthermore, the European 
countries, as shown by the example of France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, are 
already working hard to meet their commitments regarding NATO’s DCI and the ESDI.  
Closely related to this option and the argument of “unwillingness” is the option of 
increased defense spending.  Aware of the “domestic pressure for making further cuts in 
defense budget,” Rudolf Scharping, former German minister of defense, installed a 
commission in March 1999, led by the former German president, Richard Weizsäcker, to 
examine ways to reform the Bundeswehr.  Although one solution was to cut the number 
of personnel, the Weizsäcker report also mentioned that 
the change […] cannot be made without fiscal expenditures and above 
this: You have to spend to save. This is not only true of the socially 
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acceptable reduction in personnel and measures designed to increase the 
attractiveness of service in the Bundeswehr and so to help it recruit the 
people it needs […] In addition, funds will be needed to bring equipment 
and material up to modern standards and to keep them there. The 
investment share must be raised permanently.272 
However, as shown in this thesis, Germany and other European countries are 
maintaining an extensive social security net that, despite reforms, will come more and 
more under pressure as the demographic trend of aging proceeds.  Consequently, money 
will have to be shifted to social issues to secure this net, with the result that less money 
will be left for remaining public spending, including defense.  Thus, the option of 
increased defense spending is a non-option, considering the present economic situation 
and the impact of demographic developments on the future budgetary situation. 
A further policy option may be the seeking of new alliances.  The U.S. 
Commission on National Security/21st Century already suggested, before the events of 
9/11, that the importance of “traditional formal alliances will increasingly be replaced by 
coalitions of the willing.”273  Furthermore, Daniel Gouré argues that military capabilities 
are likely to erode in the future, considering the financial constraints.  Consequently, this 
may further undermine traditional alliances.  In addition, he continues, the U.S. 
government may come under “strong pressure domestically to reduce or even abandon 
alliance relationships with nations unwilling to shoulder a sufficient degree of the 
military and financial burden of such relationships.”274 
This argument, although not clearly expressed, is meant for Europe.  However, 
seeking new alliances is no solution for Europe.  In the European Security Strategy 
(ESS), published in December 2003, the European heads of state clearly emphasize the 
role of formal alliances, and the United Nations Charter is acknowledged as the 
“fundamental framework for international relations.”275  The ESS further states that the 
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“United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.”276  Therefore, one of Europe’s priorities is to 
strengthen the UN and equip it so that it is able to act effectively.277  The strategy 
emphasizes very clearly that one of the “core elements of the international system is the 
transatlantic relationship” and that “NATO is an important expression of this 
relationship,” which is consequently irreplaceable.278  Furthermore, the document 
expresses the inclusion of regional organizations in the framework of international 
relations and underlines their necessity and contribution to a more secure world.  Thus 
the European Union is interested in strengthening organizations like OSCE or ASEAN, 
MERCOSUR, and the African Union.279  Last but not least, additional evidence, that the 
policy option of seeking new alliances is a non-option for the European security idea, is 
the following declaration of intent: 
International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives 
both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and 
through partnerships with other key actors or regions. […] Acting 
together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable 
force for good in the world. […] Our aim should be an effective and 
balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the 
EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.280 
So, in sum, it can be argued that non of the above policy options fulfills the 
criteria for achieving better adapted and more effective forces and force structures.  This 
leaves to a policy option that Daniel Gouré summarizes by the term collectivized defense.  
Although Europe has already chosen this way of defense, it can be argued that this 
process has to be further intensified.  One example of collective defense among European 
countries is the introduction of common weapon systems.  Common battle groups and 
multinational brigades also contribute to the rationalization efforts.  And necessity “to 
combine efforts, to make better use of current capabilities and to enhance efficiency” was 
achieved by the establishment in 2002 of the European Airlift Coordination Cell (EACC), 
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which can be traced back to an initiative of the former German minister of defense, 
Rudolf Scharping.281  Other tools that contribute to these goals are the establishment of 
European procurement agencies like OCCAR and the new European Defense Agency 
(EDA).  By continuing to enhance these efforts, redundancies among the different 
European forces can be reduced and parallel developments can be avoided, leading to an 
optimized procurement of weapon systems.  Another step in the European development 
process is the division of labor among different nations, in other words, the specialization 
on special types of missions.282  This means, however, that the same nation would always 
be involved in conflicts in which those capabilities would be required. 
In the light of Europe’s demographic developments, its immediate geographic 
proximity to regions of crises and its present and future financial situation, it can be 
argued that from the policy options of hoping for the best, increased defense spending, 
new allies, and collective defense, only the latter policy option has a chance to be 
realized.  Europe is already on its way, but the process has to be intensified to avoid 
getting stuck in the demographic trap.  Furthermore, it has to be intensified to optimize 
the military budgets and to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of European forces. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
In the 19th and the early 20th centuries national power and security were closely 
linked to demographics.  In other words, the more people a state had, the more power was 
associated with such population.  However, with the ongoing transition process of 
societies in industrialized countries, this relationship began to change.  The population in 
these countries started to shrink as birth rates began to fall.  This process was and is still 
overlapped by increasing life expectancy and, consequently, low mortality rates.  
Although these developments are globally prognosticated by the United Nations, the 
process of aging does not occur in all societies at the same time, but as a rule of thumb 
one can predict that, in less-developed countries, the people are younger on average.  
Hence, the demographic development 
creates new challenges to the international community and to the 
traditional structure of power.  More population in most of situations 
means more threats and more conflicts, and must imply more demographic 
politics.283 
This demography, is exactly the situation European countries have to cope with.  
European societies are already aging and shrinking a trend that will cause further 
problems.  For example, the dependency ratio will increase dramatically in the future.  
Whereas in France and Great Britain 2.6 workers have to support one pensioner in 2005, 
only 1.4 workers will be available in 2050.  This situation is worse in Germany and Italy, 
where 2.2 workers support one pensioner in 2005, but in 2050 this will be done by only 
1.3 German workers and 1.0 Italian worker.  In regard to this situation and its future 
implication, Günther Nolting, spokesman for defense issues of the FDP Fraction in the 
German parliament, points out that: 
The demographic development is one of the basic factors, which 
influences the financing of the total governmental budget. Changes of the 
age structure, high unemployment rates, a bad economic situation and the 
emigration of qualified human capital are responsible for a massive 
reduction of tax revenues.  This fiscal factor leads to difficulties in 
distributing tax income. Even the defense budget is effected. […] In the 
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case, that these fiscal restrictions will continue the already insufficient 
budgetary situation, the discrepancy between wishes and realization will 
further increase.284 
Comparing now the European situation with that of its neighboring countries in 
North Africa and the Middle East, the problems induced by demography are totally 
different.  Whereas the European population is already shrinking, the societies of those 
countries are still growing.  This growth, however, is counteracted by a slow growing or 
stagnating economy, resulting in a living standard that does not keep pace with the 
population’s growth rate.285  This leads to a different set of problems and burdens than 
Europe’s for the political leaders in this region.  Because of losing their livelihood and 
diminishing resources in rural areas, people tend to move to urban centers or abroad, 
hoping for a better economic future.  Overcrowding, slum building, socio-economic 
stress, pollution and urban development are some of the resulting consequences.  This 
picture is even worse, if we take into account countries’ ethnic composition and cultural 
differences.286  This set of problems, if combined with weak governments may initiate 
domestic riots and violence that may spread to neighboring countries and may lead to 
interstate wars.  Due to this scenario, the international community is under increasing 
pressure for peace support, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.287  In 
sum, considering the emergence of this new security environment, it becomes apparent 
that “demographics, as political and strategic instrument, will tend to be more prominent 
in the future, in which the “Demographic Clash” between the North, Rich and Old, and 
the South, Poor and Young, will be bigger than never in History.”288 
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Giving those predictions of future developments, we see that not only the sources 
of conflict and also the sources of national power will change.  Thus the way future 
conflicts are waged will likely also be different.  Because of the current demographic 
trend of urbanization, military operations on urban terrain may be much more likely in 
the future than they were in the past.  Furthermore, belligerents then will try to nullify the 
technological advantage of international forces by using new strategic means such as 
guerilla warfare, terrorism, cyber attacks, ethnic diasporas, and the scarcity of renewable 
resources. 
In January 2000, the Deputy Director of International Security Studies, CSIS, 
Daniel Gouré, commented on this threat perception, and the need to adapt forces to meet 
the new security requirements was, by quoting former U.S. Secretary James Schlesinger: 
We do not wish in the West to fight as others would.  We do not see 
warfare or the management of security issues as one of placing young men 
and women, poorly armed and poorly trained, directly in the line of fire.  
In fact, the kinds of militaries that are required by our military leadership, 
by our political leadership, and by our peoples, are high-tech, highly 
trained, able to preserve life to the extent possible as well as inflict 
damage. That costs money. There is no way to have a first-class defense in 
the US and the Western countries on a second or third class budget. It is 
simply impossible.289 
These requirements cited by James Schlesinger are hard to fulfill.  The problem 
for European countries is that the financial situation is already under heavy pressure due 
to increasing age-related expenditures for pensions or health care.  Already today in 
France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, the share of health care, pensions, education, 
unemployment, and debt reliabilities of the total public expenditures lies between 42 
percent and 60 percent.  And this situation, except for Great Britain, will become even 
worse in the future.290  Consequently, increases in defense expenditures, although 
necessary and desirable, are not likely to be achieved in the present and future budgetary 
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situation.  Thus, other ways have to be found to meet the reform and transformation 
requirements. 
During the first internal reform of European forces, steps were taken to reduce 
redundancies and foster optimization.  The next step is to tailor forces to appropriate 
future missions.  However, due to the socio-economic constraints, combined with the 
resulting budgetary burdens, it will become difficult for European nations to maintain 
their own extensive force package. 
Therefore, the final conclusion is that European integration has to be further 
fostered and deepened.  Europe has to enhance its efforts to integrate and transform 
national into European armed forces in order to get the most effective armed forces under 
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